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This booklet, authored by Senator Peter H. Dominick and published by the Committee of One Million (Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations), embodies the fervent anti-Communist sentiment that influenced American foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s. Illustrated by a striking red dragon wrapped around the globe, the cover imagery visually underscores the fear of a rapidly expanding “Red China,” said to threaten not only Asia but also the stability of global institutions like the U.N.
Historical Context
During the height of the Cold War, the People’s Republic of China—commonly referred to in the West as “Red China” or “Communist China”—remained unrecognized by the United States. Instead, the U.S. government continued to recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan) as “China’s” legitimate representative at the United Nations. The Committee of One Million emerged in 1953 with the explicit goal of preventing the admission of the PRC into the U.N., reflecting widespread fear that conceding this point would embolden Communist expansion. Both Democrats and Republicans of the era, including leaders such as President Eisenhower and President Johnson, often maintained a hardline stance against “Red China,” arguing that conceding its entry into the U.N. would undermine American alliances and national security.
Senator Dominick’s booklet fits squarely into this landscape. Written in the mid-1960s—a time when some American politicians and foreign allies began advocating a reexamination of U.S. policy—it rebuts voices that suggested either recognizing the PRC or using China’s rift with the Soviet Union to America’s diplomatic advantage. Instead, Dominick stresses the ideological and strategic perils of “appeasing” Beijing.
Strategy and Content
- Alarmist Framing
The booklet portrays the PRC as an aggressively expansionist regime. By describing the leadership in Beijing as “Communist usurpers,” Dominick warns that recognizing them at the U.N. would validate a government bent on subverting freedom in Asia and beyond. - Bipartisan Support
A key rhetorical tactic is emphasizing broad American agreement: the text cites both the 1964 Republican and Democratic Party platforms—each taking a stance against admitting the PRC to the U.N. This appeal to unity bolsters the sense that opposition to “Red China” transcended everyday partisan divides. - Critique of “Concessions”
Dominick rejects proposals such as economic aid or food shipments, labeling them naïve. He insists these would not reform Beijing but would instead sustain an oppressive regime. Drawing on think tank opinions and strategic studies, the pamphlet casts doubt on any policy that might “soften” U.S. opposition. - Moral and Ideological Positioning
At its core, the argument hinges on morality: Americans, the text says, cannot “advance justice by placating Communists who despise justice.” In so doing, Dominick presents the anti-admission stance as both principled and necessary to defend democracy.
Imagery and Language
- Cover Illustration
A red dragon, stylized to appear ferocious and cunning, coils around a representation of a cage or globe—instantly conveying menace and control. This visual sets the tone for the booklet’s resolute warning against “Communist infiltration and terror.” - Stark Terminology
Words like “threat,” “appeasement,” and “aggressive” appear prominently, reflecting the emotional register of Cold War propaganda. The repeated references to “Red China” rather than the People’s Republic of China underscores the pamphlet’s ideological bent.
Impact
Within the context of the era, material from the Committee of One Million appealed strongly to many Americans’ Cold War fears, reinforcing a diplomatic status quo that kept the PRC out of the U.N. until 1971. Critics—both then and now—argue that such hardline messaging oversimplified complex international realities and stifled opportunities for engagement or détente. Nonetheless, the booklet and others like it had real impact in shaping public discourse, ensuring that for years, opposing “Red China’s” U.N. admission remained politically mainstream.
China’s eventual admission to the United Nations in 1971 signaled a major shift in international relations, albeit one spurred by changing global alliances and diplomatic maneuvering rather than the anti-admission campaigns. Yet this pamphlet stands as a vivid snapshot of how anti-Communist advocacy groups used compelling imagery and stark rhetoric to influence American public opinion and policy. It remains relevant today as a reminder of how propaganda, moral language, and bipartisan unity can combine to solidify a particular foreign-policy stance—even in the face of evolving geopolitical realities.
`Special thanks to the USC Digital Imaging Lab for their support in digitizing this item.`
