The Coalition Behind Iran Protests: Monarchists, Republicans, and MEK

Over one million Iranians and supporters filled streets across three continents in what organizers called a “global day of action” demanding regime change in Iran. The largest crowds assembled in Munich, Germany—250,000 people gathering during the Munich Security Conference. Massive demonstrations also erupted in Los Angeles and Toronto, with thousands more rallying in cities worldwide.

The demonstrations didn’t happen spontaneously. Exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi called for the coordinated event, calling himself the leader of “Iran’s Lion and Sun Revolution.” But the coalition that answered his call was far more complex than a unified opposition movement.

These protests brought together an unusual alliance: monarchists who want to restore the Pahlavi dynasty, secular republicans who oppose both theocracy and monarchy, controversial elements of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), and mainstream Iranian-American community organizations. They shared opposition to the Islamic Republic but held completely different visions for Iran’s future.

Strategic Timing and Scale

Pahlavi timed the demonstrations to coincide with the Munich Security Conference, where European leaders and U.S. officials gather annually to discuss international security. By placing the largest demonstration at this venue, organizers put maximum pressure on leaders while they were talking about Iran policy.

In Munich, German police confirmed approximately 250,000 people gathered at the city’s Theresienwiese fairgrounds. DW News correspondent Mishel Vatzka reported on-site that the assembly was “not only the biggest demonstration in the history of the Munich Security Conference, but it might as well be one of the biggest demonstrations in Munich ever.”

Participants traveled from Hamburg, Cologne, France, Belgium, Hungary—one woman flew from Australia specifically to attend. The mobilization required planning across countries.

In Los Angeles, home to one of the world’s largest Iranian diaspora communities with 500,000 to 600,000 Iranian-Americans, thousands filled downtown streets near City Hall and Grand Park. The demonstration remained peaceful throughout the afternoon, with crowds still substantial at 4 PM as organizers continued coordinating the event.

Visual Messaging

Participants widely displayed the Lion and Sun flag—the pre-Islamic Revolution flag symbolizing the Pahlavi monarchy era. This was a deliberate statement showing that monarchists had significant influence in organizing.

Many held placards supporting Reza Pahlavi, calling him “king” or depicting him as a leader figure. In a striking echo of U.S. political symbolism, numerous demonstrators wore red “Make Iran Great Again” caps, directly mimicking Trump campaign merchandise.

Some carried Israeli flags—a deliberate choice showing how Pahlavi positions himself as a “pro-Israel alternative for Iran.”

The overall message was clear: support for monarchy restoration, alignment with the West (particularly the U.S. and Israel), and rejection of the Islamic Republic’s approach to the region.

The Coalition

Reza Pahlavi’s Central Role

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi emerged as the primary organizer and symbolic leader. Born in Tehran in 1960, he was named Crown Prince during his father’s coronation in 1967. When the Islamic Revolution overthrew his father in 1979, young Pahlavi was serving as a cadet at Reese Air Force Base in the United States—which kept him outside Iran and saved his life.

For nearly fifty years, Pahlavi has lived in exile, primarily in the United States. But the demonstrations represented a major step up in his political work—a massive, coordinated global mobilization.

At the Munich Security Conference, Pahlavi called for “tighter sanctions, potential military strikes and quick political change to overthrow Iran’s government,” warning that “negotiations and delay would cost more lives.” He framed the choice facing the West as either/or: “It is time to end the Islamic Republic.”

Pahlavi denied seeking personal power. When asked about his future role, he stated: “I’m not running for office. I’m not running for a job. I’m not seeking a power or a title. The day that happens, I consider that the end of my political work in life.” Instead, he presented himself as someone who would help Iran transition to democracy, leading a transitional government before holding free elections.

The Monarchist Movement

Pahlavi’s call activated a broader monarchist movement within the Iranian diaspora. This faction includes various organizations and individuals who view restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty—or at minimum, a constitutional monarchy—as the right way to run Iran after the Islamic Republic.

The monarchist faction is particularly strong in Los Angeles, where Iranian-American communities are concentrated in neighborhoods known as “Tehrangeles” or “Little Persia.” Having so many Iranians in one area meant there were already community organizations, media outlets, and networks through which organizing could happen.

Many participants called for Pahlavi to assume leadership in Iran’s future government. Chants of “Pahlavi for Iran” and “Javid shah” (long live the shah) reflected this royalist sentiment. The widespread display of the Lion and Sun flag symbolized where the monarchists wanted Iran to go.

But the monarchist faction contains internal divisions. Older exiles who fled during or after the 1979 revolution retain memories of the Shah’s reign and often view his rule with nostalgia. Younger diaspora members, many born after 1979, lack direct experience with Pahlavi rule and may view monarchy as a historical curiosity rather than a desired future.

Republican and Democratic Opposition

The coalition also included secular republicans who reject monarchy restoration and instead want a democratic republic that keeps religion and government separate. These elements participated in the demonstrations but maintained different messages focusing on democracy and keeping religion out of government.

A Dallas Iranian-American community rally on February 1—a precursor to the global day—illustrates this faction’s stance. Participants carried banners reading “Regime change in Iran by the people of Iran” and “Independence, Freedom, Republic, Republic,” alongside signs reading “No to the Shah! No to the Mullahs!”

This clearly rejected both the Islamic Republic and the monarchical alternative. British former Speaker of the House John Bercow, speaking at a press conference during the Munich demonstrations, argued that conference organizers made “an extraordinary error of judgment” by inviting Pahlavi. Bercow cautioned against assuming that “the alternative to the current dictatorship is a monarchical figure,” calling such an idea “outdated and ancient.”

Republicans participated in demonstrations heavily dominated by monarchist messaging and imagery, yet kept their own different beliefs about what they wanted. This raises questions about whether the coalition can hold together if initial tactics fail to produce results.

The MEK Component

One of the most controversial elements was the participation of the MEK (Mujahedin-e-Khalq), also known as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran.

Originally founded as a Marxist-Islamic organization in the 1960s to oppose the Shah’s monarchy, the MEK initially participated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution but subsequently opposed the Islamic Republic. The U.S. State Department historically alleged that MEK members were involved in killings of U.S. personnel in Iran during the 1970s, though the MEK denies these allegations. More controversially, the MEK based itself in Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s protection for years, receiving support from the Iraqi government—which critics say hurt its claim to be Iranian.

The United States designated the MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization from 1997 until September 2012, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton removed it from the FTO list. The delisting cited the MEK’s “public renunciation of violence, the absence of confirmed acts of terrorism by the MEK for more than a decade,” and cooperation in closing its Iraq-based Camp Ashraf. However, even upon delisting, the State Department noted serious concerns about the organization, “particularly with regard to allegations of abuse committed against its own members.”

During the demonstrations, the MEK maintained a distinct organizational presence. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), which the MEK dominates, held a press conference in Munich featuring Mohammad Mohaddessin, Chairman of the NCRI’s Foreign Affairs Committee. Mohaddessin presented casualty figures attributed to the MEK’s internal network: 2,411 identified victims of the January crackdown, including 259 women and at least 174 children and teenagers under 18, alongside claims of over 50,000 arrests.

While the organization brought organizing skills and resources and claimed to represent a network of “Resistance Units” inside Iran, its controversial history and persistent allegations of cult-like control over members raised questions about whether its presence strengthened or undermined the opposition’s legitimacy.

The Trump Administration Connection

A distinctive feature of the coalition was its connection to the Trump administration and Republican politics. Participants wore “Make Iran Great Again” caps. Some protest signs appealed to President Trump for military intervention. Pahlavi directly addressed Trump at Munich: “To President Trump… The Iranian people heard you say help is on the way, and they have faith in you. Help them.”

This alignment reflected the Trump administration’s own increasingly aggressive talk toward Iran. On February 13—the day before the demonstrations—Trump stated that change in Iran would be “the best thing that could happen,” adding: “For 47 years, they’ve been talking and talking and talking. In the meantime, we’ve lost a lot of lives while they talk.” Trump confirmed that a second aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, was departing for the Middle East to join U.S. military forces in the region.

This coordination between demonstrator appeals to Trump and Trump’s own increasingly aggressive talk created a political opportunity: the visible mobilization of over one million people internationally calling for military intervention could be used by Trump administration officials as proof of international support for a military option against Iran.

Impact and Effectiveness

Stated Goals

The organizing coalition stated several main goals. Most explicitly, demonstrators called for overthrowing the government in Iran—specifically the overthrow of the Islamic Republic system. Second, many demonstrations included demands for U.S. and Western military intervention to support Iranian protesters. Third, organizers sought to pressure world leaders assembled at the Munich Security Conference to take concrete steps in response to the humanitarian crisis inside Iran.

The demonstrations also sought to raise international awareness of the alleged death toll inside Iran. Opposition groups claimed 7,000 to 36,500 people had been killed, far exceeding the government’s official figure of 3,117. By placing massive crowds in front of international media cameras, organizers aimed to force coverage of the human cost of Iran’s crackdown.

Media Coverage: Mixed Results

The demonstrations achieved substantial media coverage across international outlets. The Munich gathering generated coverage from virtually all major international news organizations—Reuters, AFP, BBC, Deutsche Welle, and specialized outlets covering Iran. The scale made the event difficult for major media to ignore.

But the nature of coverage was mixed. Coverage varied depending on the outlet and geographical location. Some coverage emphasized the humanitarian crisis inside Iran and its connection to protests. Other coverage focused primarily on the organizing and political side of getting exiles to protest.

The demonstrations did generate coverage at the Munich Security Conference itself. The visible presence of a quarter-million people protesting outside the venue where world leaders were meeting created a backdrop for conference discussions. However, whether this presence changed what the conference discussed remains unclear.

Political Response: Limited Impact

The demonstrations’ effectiveness in achieving their central goal—securing Western military intervention in Iran—remains doubtful. While the Trump administration was already pursuing an aggressive posture toward Iran, including military threats and nuclear negotiation ultimatums, there’s no evidence that the demonstrations changed how the administration was thinking about policy or made it easier politically to launch military strikes.

Within the international community more broadly, responses were muted. European governments represented at the Munich Security Conference didn’t announce new military initiatives against Iran in response to the demonstrations. The European Union’s position on Iran remained focused on negotiations and sanctions enforcement rather than military options.

Congressional responses in the United States were similarly limited, with no evidence of legislative initiatives emerging directly in response to the demonstrations.

Organizational Capacity

The organization required to achieve simultaneous demonstrations across multiple continents, with messaging coordination and logistical planning, demonstrated significant capacity.

The mobilization revealed the depth of feeling within the diaspora community about the Islamic Republic and the ongoing crackdown inside Iran. Participants traveled from other countries and took time from their lives to participate, suggesting commitment rather than sympathy.

Tactical Weaknesses

But the demonstrations also showed some problems with their approach. First, the prominent display of monarchist imagery and association with Reza Pahlavi hurt their credibility. Many Iranians inside and outside Iran oppose monarchy restoration, viewing the Shah’s reign negatively and seeing the royal flag as a symbol of authoritarian rule preceding the Islamic Republic.

A leaked document allegedly revealing pro-monarchist media strategy suggested that at least some elements of the coalition were engaged in coordinated messaging campaigns designed to create the appearance of broader support for Pahlavi than existed. The document outlined instructions for supporters to bring “friends and relatives… however possible” and to position themselves in media-accessible locations to create favorable crowd photos, suggesting that the visual appearance was being carefully managed.

Second, the alignment with Trump administration policies and “Make Iran Great Again” imagery created potential political complications. The coordination with Republican talking points raised questions about the degree to which demonstrations represented genuine opposition feelings versus coordinated political messaging.

Third, the demonstrations may have helped the Islamic Republic by giving them propaganda. The government could and did argue that demonstrations represented “exile politics” disconnected from genuine Iranian sentiment and that the involvement of monarchist elements and controversial organizations undermined the opposition’s legitimacy.

Historical Context

The Bay of Pigs: When Exile-Led Operations Fail

The classic example of diaspora-led overthrow remains the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. Cuban exiles who had fled Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution received training and support from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to conduct a military invasion aimed at overthrowing the new Cuban government. The plan expected that Cuban people and parts of the military would support the invasion, facilitating rapid collapse.

The operation failed catastrophically. The invading force was defeated within three days by the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces. The Bay of Pigs demonstrated that exile-led military operations, even when backed by a superpower, could fail if the situation inside the country wasn’t right for invasion or if the target government possessed sufficient military capacity.

Venezuela: Impressive Mobilization, Regime Survival

The Venezuelan opposition case provides a closer contemporary parallel. Between 2019 and 2025, the Venezuelan opposition, heavily supported by diaspora activists, ran a campaign calling for overthrow and international intervention. The opposition declared Juan Guaidó the interim president of Venezuela, organized massive demonstrations, and lobbied the Trump administration for military support.

Despite impressive diaspora mobilization and significant international support from the Trump administration, the Maduro government survived. The government kept control of the police and military leadership, preventing the military from switching sides like opposition strategists hoped would occur. The opposition coalition fractured over time, with disagreements about strategy and approach weakening their united effort. Prolonged failure to achieve stated objectives gradually eroded opposition momentum and public morale.

The Venezuelan case suggests that opposition coalitions organized around a single individual or a single tactic may fall apart when those tactics fail to produce results. This raises questions about whether Iranian opposition organizing can continue if military intervention doesn’t materialize or if the Islamic Republic continues to resist pressure.

Syria: When Humanitarian Crisis Isn’t Enough

The Syrian case presents a different lesson: even humanitarian catastrophes involving hundreds of thousands of deaths and massive diaspora activism may not generate the international military response that opposition groups call for. Between 2011 and 2015, Syrian opposition groups called extensively for Western military intervention to support the uprising against Bashar al-Assad, arguing that humanitarian intervention was necessary to prevent atrocities.

The Syrian opposition did achieve a level of international recognition and support. However, large-scale Western military intervention comparable to the Libya 2011 intervention never materialized. Russia’s entry into the Syrian civil war in 2015, supporting the Assad government, further shifted the military balance against the opposition.

This historical pattern suggests that Western governments became more cautious about military interventions in the Middle East following the Iraq War and the complications that followed Libya’s 2011 overthrow. The Syrian case demonstrates that diaspora advocacy, even when combined with genuine humanitarian crisis documentation, faces limits.

Successful Mobilizations

However, not all diaspora mobilization cases end in failure. The 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, involving over 250,000 participants—comparable in scale to the 2026 Iran demonstrations—generated powerful media coverage and contributed to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The “Singing Revolution” in Estonia offers another relevant model. Between 1988 and 1991, Estonians conducted sustained peaceful resistance to Soviet rule, with major mass demonstrations including singing as a primary tactic for asserting national identity and resistance. The peaceful resistance, combined with broader Soviet collapse, eventually contributed to Estonian independence in 1991.

These cases suggest that mass mobilization can be effective when combined with: sustained effort over time rather than single dramatic events; clear credibility and support from the people inside the country; favorable international conditions; and coordination combining multiple tactics beyond single massive demonstrations.

Research on Nonviolent Resistance

Research on nonviolent resistance by Erica Chenoweth and collaborators demonstrates that nonviolent campaigns have been roughly twice as successful as violent campaigns in achieving their stated goals between 1900 and 2006. However, Chenoweth’s research also reveals that large-scale participation (usually meaning at least 3.5% of a country’s population) is linked to success, but most nonviolent campaigns that succeed do so without reaching this participation threshold.

For the Iranian opposition, these findings point in different directions. On one hand, the demonstrated capacity to mobilize over one million diaspora members globally suggests significant organizational sophistication and commitment to nonviolent methods—both factors associated with successful movements. On the other hand, diaspora mobilization in Western countries can’t itself make up 3.5% of Iran’s 88+ million people, and mobilization inside Iran is limited by the ongoing security crackdown and internet blackouts.

The research suggests that opposition campaigns require large-scale mobilization inside the country itself to achieve transformation, not merely diaspora activity.

Future Scenarios

Sustained Momentum Without Breakthrough

The opposition may continue organizing regular large-scale demonstrations and advocacy, maintaining visibility without achieving military intervention or dramatic overthrow. This path would resemble the long-term Cuban exile political engagement or Hong Kong diaspora activism post-2020—sustained pressure and organizing without achieving their main goal of transformation.

Under this scenario, the opposition would gradually shift toward long-term political influence and cultural preservation and support for internal resistance rather than expecting imminent collapse. This assumes the Islamic Republic maintains its security apparatus and survives international pressure.

Coalition Fracture

Alternatively, tensions within the opposition coalition could become more visible and damaging. If military intervention doesn’t materialize, if sanctions intensify without producing overthrow, or if the Islamic Republic successfully wins over parts of the opposition movement, the coalition could fragment.

Monarchists and republicans could openly compete for dominance, the MEK could be marginalized or face renewed skepticism, and mainstream community organizations could distance themselves from political factions. This path would resemble the Venezuelan opposition’s experience—initial unity fragmenting into competing elements, each claiming to be legitimate and trying to present themselves as the “true” opposition.

International Military Escalation

Under a third scenario, the Trump administration or another Western government could determine that military intervention against Iran is strategically justified, possibly partly because of the international protests. This could involve air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, Revolutionary Guard infrastructure, or broader campaign aimed at destabilizing the government.

This scenario would match opposition hopes but comes with unknowns and risks. Historical cases of external military intervention aimed at overthrowing governments—Iraq 2003, Libya 2011—have had mixed results, with the removal of old governments sometimes followed by prolonged instability and violence. There’s no guarantee that military intervention would produce the democratic transition outcome that opposition groups envision or that internal resistance would be able to take control following military defeat.

Internal Transformation Without External Intervention

A fourth possibility would involve the Islamic Republic’s eventual collapse or major change caused mainly by forces inside Iran—sustained internal resistance, economic collapse, or splits among the elite—without dramatic external military intervention. Under this scenario, the diaspora’s role would be supporting internal resistance, maintaining international attention, and preparing plans for how to govern after the government falls.

This scenario matches what research shows: that sustained internal mobilization, rather than external intervention, typically drives overthrow. It would require patience and organizational commitment from diaspora activists and wouldn’t produce quick dramatic results.

Regime Responses

The Islamic Republic has already responded to the demonstrations with propaganda claiming that they represent “exile politics” disconnected from genuine Iranian sentiment and that they’re organized by enemy countries, particularly the United States. The government is likely to continue using diaspora opposition activity as evidence that the opposition is Western-backed and possibly illegitimate.

Inside Iran, the government has shown it’s willing to use force to suppress opposition. The ongoing crackdown that began in late December 2025 has resulted in death toll estimates ranging from the government’s official figure of 3,117 to independent assessments as high as 36,500. If demonstrations continue, security forces will likely continue using deadly force, surveillance, and arrests to prevent mobilization.

Conclusion

The global demonstrations represented a remarkable moment of diaspora mobilization. The scale of these events demonstrated significant organizational capacity and deep feeling within the diaspora about the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy and the ongoing humanitarian crisis inside Iran.

But the coalition that organized them faces internal complexities. The alliance between monarchists seeking restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty, secular republicans opposing both theocracy and monarchy, the controversial Mujahedin-e-Khalq organization, and mainstream Iranian-American community organizations represented an unusual coalition united more by what they opposed—the Islamic Republic—than by what they wanted instead.

The demand for Western military intervention, while clearly articulated, faced major obstacles. Following the Iraq War and the complications that followed the Libya intervention, Western governments have been reluctant about military operations meant to overthrow governments in the Middle East. The Trump administration’s aggressive rhetoric toward Iran created better conditions for intervention than in previous administrations, but turning talk into sustained military strikes remained uncertain.

Viewed through the lens of historical precedent, the demonstrations showed both the possibilities and limitations of diaspora activism. The Cuban exile movement demonstrated that diaspora communities could have long-term political influence through constant pressure. The Venezuelan case illustrated that diaspora mobilization, even when combined with international support, could fail to remove entrenched regimes. The Syrian case showed that humanitarian crises and diaspora advocacy don’t automatically generate military intervention. And research suggested that sustained internal mobilization, rather than diaspora activity alone, typically drives overthrow.

The opposition coalition has significant organizing skills but faces strategic problems. Keeping the coalition together among groups with completely different visions of Iran’s future will require ongoing attention and compromise. Turning diaspora mobilization into policy changes and transformation requires constant effort, strategy, and international conditions that remain uncertain.

The coming months and years will reveal whether the demonstrations represent a turning point toward overthrow or a moment of impressive but limited opposition activity in the longer story of the Islamic Republic’s survival. The coalition has demonstrated it can mobilize impressive numbers. Whether it can turn those numbers into political change remains the unanswered question.

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