Minneapolis ICE Protests Echo 1980s Sanctuary Movement Tactics

Hundreds gathered outside the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building in Minneapolis on a subzero February night, marking one month since ICE agent Jonathan Ross fired three shots through Renée Good’s windshield, killing the 37-year-old mother of three. What began as a memorial service escalated into confrontation—42 arrests as demonstrators threw bottles and ice chunks at federal officers guarding the building.

The February 2026 event capped a month of sustained resistance that organizers deliberately copied from the 1980s Sanctuary Movement—when churches across America sheltered Central American refugees from deportation. Only this time, organizers did more: a statewide general strike that shut down 700 businesses and drew up to 100,000 people into subzero streets. One hundred clergy arrested at the airport, kneeling in prayer while blocking deportation flights. A coordinated national shutdown spreading across 300 locations in all fifty states.

By early February, the Trump administration announced it would withdraw 700 immigration agents from Minnesota, roughly 25 percent of federal agents in the state. Organizers rejected this as inadequate, demanding complete withdrawal and criminal prosecution of the officers who killed Good and Alex Pretti, a 37-year-old ICU nurse shot ten days after documenting ICE operations on his phone.

The 1980s Sanctuary Movement

The Sanctuary Movement emerged between 1980 and 1985 when the Reagan administration refused asylum to Central Americans fleeing civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. Nearly a million people crossed the border seeking safety. In El Salvador alone, the military had killed over 10,000 people by 1980, including Archbishop Óscar Romero and four U.S. churchwomen. In Guatemala, government-backed paramilitaries killed 50,000, disappeared 100,000, and perpetrated 626 village massacres.

Reagan’s response? Call them economic migrants and deport them back into the violence.

On March 24, 1982—the second anniversary of Archbishop Romero’s assassination—Rev. John Fife of Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson announced his church would be a public sanctuary. He posted banners reading “This is a Sanctuary for the Oppressed of Central America” and “Immigration: do not violate the Sanctuary of God.” By 1985, approximately 500 churches and synagogues had joined the network.

The movement combined secret methods—smuggling refugees across borders through underground networks—with public methods that announced they were providing sanctuary openly, accepting the legal risks. Churches provided food, shelter, and legal assistance. Refugees spoke at services, shared stories at Bible studies, attended special peace nights.

The federal government responded aggressively. In 1985, the INS launched Operation Sojourner, sending paid informants into sanctuary communities to gain trust and report back. The government indicted sanctuary workers on alien smuggling and conspiracy charges. Eight were convicted. But because of intense international outcry, judges imposed probation rather than jail sentences—a partial victory for defendants who’d openly broke the law to make a point.

In 1990, Congress passed legislation allowing Salvadorans and Guatemalans to apply for Temporary Protected Status. The movement also contributed to the American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh case, which created new legal protections for refugees.

The Sanctuary Movement kept going throughout the decade and beyond. It didn’t achieve immediate victories through dramatic new tactics. It won through persistence—keeping up the pressure across multiple administrations until policy changed.

How Minneapolis Adapted the Playbook

The 2026 Minneapolis campaign took the Sanctuary Movement’s foundation and expanded it dramatically. Rather than focusing primarily on faith-based organizing, it built a coalition including institutional labor unions, student movements, and radical independent organizing groups. Rather than concentrating on refugee protection, organizers openly demanded ICE abolition as a long-term goal.

The immediate trigger was Good’s death on January 7. Bystander video showed ICE agent Jonathan Ross approaching her Honda Pilot as she briefly reversed, then began moving forward in the correct direction of traffic, turning away from his position. Ross fired three shots through the windshield and driver’s side window at close range, killing her as the vehicle passed him.

The administration called Good a domestic terrorist who’d attempted to run over officers. Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey and Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison rejected this description. Minneapolis Police Chief Brian O’Hara described the killing as something that didn’t have to happen.

Then came Alex Pretti’s death on January 24. Video footage that ABC News verified showed the ICU nurse documenting ICE operations with his phone, attempting to help a woman whom federal agents had shoved to the ground. After being pepper-sprayed, Pretti was tackled by agents who discovered he carried a legally licensed handgun. Video appears to show one agent removing Pretti’s weapon before officers fired approximately ten shots in less than five seconds.

DHS Secretary Kristi Noem claimed Pretti “arrived at the scene to inflict maximum damage on individuals and to kill law enforcement”—a claim the video evidence contradicted.

These two killings sparked what organizers called the “Day of Truth and Freedom” on January 23—a statewide general strike that became the campaign’s main event.

The General Strike

Approximately 100 clergy members conducted a sit-in at Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport, kneeling in prayer while blocking roads. That afternoon, the crowd swelled to an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 people who marched through downtown despite temperatures dropping to negative 20 degrees Fahrenheit.

Organizers estimated that approximately 700 small businesses closed on January 23 in solidarity. At stores like Half Price Books, UFCW members had individual conversations with store managers about why closure mattered. Managers then pressured company headquarters. Cultural institutions including the Minneapolis Institute of Art, the Guthrie Theater, and seven First Avenue music venues operated with skeleton crews or chose to close. Immigrant-owned businesses in locations like Karmel Mall and Hmongtown Marketplace chose to close.

According to polling done after the strike, approximately one in four Minnesota voters either participated or had a loved one who did. Among those participants, 38 percent stayed off the job. Among self-identified liberal voters, roughly one in five said they missed work.

This created what organizers termed an “economic shutdown”—deliberately using economic pressure to create pressure for policy change. Research on general strikes shows that “a leader’s power ultimately depends on the cooperation of the people; if that cooperation is withheld—for example, when ‘the country’s economy is paralyzed’—then the ruler’s ability to govern and enforce his will disintegrates.”

The Federal Response

A Department of Homeland Security official called the strike “beyond insane.” But within days, administration officials acknowledged a strategic shift. On January 27, border czar Tom Homan arrived in the Twin Cities to “deal with the political situation.”

By February 4, Homan announced that approximately 700 immigration agents would be withdrawn from Minnesota effective immediately. This represented a significant reduction, though Homan stated that approximately 2,100 immigration enforcement personnel would remain in the state.

Homan’s withdrawal came with conditions. He directly linked the reduction to what he called “unprecedented cooperation” from state and local authorities, specifically citing agreements by county jails to notify ICE in advance of releasing individuals with criminal histories.

But Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison publicly disputed Homan’s claims, stating he “did not negotiate” with Homan, “come to any agreement, or offer any compromise.” He reiterated Minnesota law prohibiting detention based solely on ICE detainer requests without judicial warrants.

Who Made It Happen

The public institutional leadership came from university-based organizations. The University of Minnesota Graduate Labor Union was one of the main coordinating groups. AFSCME Local 3800, representing university clerical and technical workers, played a significant role. The Black Student Union and Undergraduate Student Government organized students on campus, alongside numerous student organizations including the Lao Student Association, Asian American Student Union, Students for Justice in Palestine, and Young Democratic Socialists of America.

Faith community organizing gave the campaign moral authority. Among the arrested clergy were Rev. Katherine Lewis of St. David’s Episcopal Church, Rev. Daniel Ruth of Lutheran Partners in Global Ministry, and Rev. Amanda Lunemann of Grace United Methodist Church. These figures described their participation as based on religious conviction, not partisan politics.

Rev. Daniel Ruth explained the religious reasoning: “They are my neighbor, and I feel that at a deep faith level.” Rev. Mariah Furness Tollgaard, senior pastor of Hamline Church, described the January 23 strike as feeling “holy—like Resurrection morning, like Pentecost fire on the prairie wind.”

Labor union participation came from both large institutional unions and grassroots worker organizing. The Minneapolis Regional Labor Federation coordinated labor participation, with president Chelsie Glaubitz Gabiou explaining what workers had at stake: “Working people, our schools and our communities are under attack. Union members are being detained commuting to and from work, tearing apart families.”

UNITE HERE Local 17 organized workers at cultural institutions and restaurants. SEIU locals organized healthcare workers to participate. The United Food and Commercial Workers Local 663 organized at grocery co-ops, with store managers pressuring corporate headquarters to close in solidarity.

Radical independent groups played a less visible but significant role. The organizing coalition reportedly included the Party for Socialism and Liberation and other socialist and communist activist networks. While these groups stayed more out of the public eye than institutional organizations, their work on strategy, messaging, and coordinating tactics was substantial.

The Participant Base

The movement reflected Minnesota’s demographic and political context. The Twin Cities has a significant Somali immigrant community, with approximately 84,000 people across the region. Most Somali Minnesotans (58 percent) were born in the United States, and of those born abroad, 87 percent had obtained citizenship.

Operation Metro Surge had specifically targeted the Somali community, with early December federal operations described by both media and DHS as focused on “undocumented Somali immigrants.” This targeting of an established immigrant community with strong community organizations and political connections turned out to be strategically important. Somali Americans had achieved notable political representation, including in the U.S. House of Representatives, and had community organizations capable of organizing responses to federal enforcement.

The coalition included both people directly threatened by immigration enforcement and broader groups supporting immigrant rights. Legal observers documented federal agent operations. Individuals arrested on charges of “impeding ICE operations” included diverse backgrounds from clergy to student activists to community members.

What Worked and What Didn’t

The most concrete achievement was the withdrawal of 700 federal agents. The administration had deployed approximately 2,800 agents to Minnesota beginning in December 2025. The withdrawal reduced this presence while still maintaining roughly 2,100 agents—far above the approximately 150 who typically operated in Minnesota.

Organizers rejected the withdrawal as inadequate. The main stated goal was “immediate withdrawal of federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection agents, Minnesota” in their entirety. Rep. Ilhan Omar declared “every single ICE and CBP agent” should be out of Minnesota. The Not Above the Law coalition described Homan’s announcement as “more a minor concession than a meaningful policy shift.”

Regarding criminal prosecution of officers involved in the killings—the second major demand—the situation remained unresolved. The Department of Justice Civil Rights Division refused to open a constitutional investigation into either killing, prompting more than a dozen federal prosecutors in the Twin Cities and Washington to resign in opposition. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison filed suit against DHS to halt ICE deployments, but criminal prosecution remained uncertain.

ICE Chief Todd Lyons refused to apologize to the families, stating only that he would “welcome the opportunity to speak to the family in private” while declining to comment on “active investigation.”

Public Opinion Shifts

The campaign created notable public opinion shifts. Polling by YouGov revealed that 42 percent of Americans somewhat or strongly supported eliminating ICE—a significant increase from 29 percent in 2018 and 33 percent in 2019. Majorities of Americans (67 percent) said the ICE agent wasn’t justified in the shooting and should face criminal charges.

The campaign’s impact on media attention was substantial. Sixty percent of Minnesota voters had heard “a lot” about the January 23 strike, with an additional 23 percent hearing “a little”—meaning 83 percent of voters were aware of it. This was higher than typical awareness levels for demonstrations.

Sustaining Pressure

Research on effectiveness reveals that “size and duration, or how long you sustain a protest” emerges as “important factors in the success of a protest.”

The Minneapolis campaign dealt with this problem through the January 30 “National Shutdown,” coordinating 300 documented locations across all fifty states. Rather than concentrating effort in a single location, this spread-out approach made coordination easier while reaching more places.

But research also shows that “single-day protest tends to come and go,” with campaigns over time being more effective at producing lasting change than one-time mass protests.

The Nonviolence Question

The February 7 federal building confrontation illustrated the complex relationship between nonviolence and disruption. While the movement stayed strongly nonviolent throughout the month-long campaign, the throwing of bottles and ice chunks was a tactical shift toward more confrontational tactics.

Research shows that “nonviolent campaigns achieve success” more rapidly than violent ones—nonviolent resistance succeeds in approximately 51 percent of campaigns versus only 26 percent of violent campaigns. However, research also demonstrates that “even when the overwhelming majority of activists remain nonviolent, nonviolent movements that mix in some armed violence are less successful in the end.”

Rather than openly endorsing property destruction, organizer statements condemned such tactics while maintaining focus on broader demands. This reflected what scholars call the “radical flank effect”—the finding that “the presence of radical flanks within a movement increases support for more moderate factions.”

By maintaining a clear distinction between the peaceful majority engaging in civil disobedience, prayer, and economic organizing, and a smaller number of participants engaging in more confrontational tactics, the movement potentially increased public support for the moderate faction’s core demands.

What History Teaches About What Comes Next

The partial federal withdrawal announced on February 4 created what scholars call a “partial victory” situation—achievement of some demands without reaching ultimate objectives.

Some movements, seeing partial victories as fundamental shifts, demobilize prematurely and get rolled back. Other movements see partial victories as confirmation that pressure works and escalate demands accordingly. The Minnesota campaign’s framing of the 700-agent withdrawal as inadequate rather than celebratory suggested organizers chose the second option.

But keeping the coalition unified would require ongoing effort. Labor unions might declare victory with partial federal withdrawal and focus on other issues. Faith communities might reduce engagement after moral witness through civil disobedience. Student movements faced semester schedules that could break up ongoing organizing.

The 1980s Sanctuary Movement offers a lesson: it succeeded partly because it maintained pressure through multiple administrations and electoral cycles. The movement achieved Temporary Protected Status and legal protections not through dramatic new tactics but through persistence across years.

The contemporary movement faced a second term with over three years of potential continued enforcement. Whether organizers could keep the coalition together, adapt tactics to changing federal approaches, and keep public attention over such an extended period was the decisive question.

The Minnesota Context

One legal scholar who analyzed Operation Metro Surge concluded that “it’s hard to believe” the notion that Governor Walz or Mayor Frey could have avoided this operation “by agreeing to assist ICE.” The scholar suggested that “Operation Metro Surge was meant as a ‘DAY OF RECKONING & RETRIBUTION’ for members of a political community labeled as the administration’s political enemies.”

This analysis suggested that partial retreat showed acknowledgment of political costs rather than genuine backing down. Federal authorities had demonstrated particular focus on Minnesota, with political explanations centering on Governor Tim Walz being Vice President Kamala Harris’s running mate and the state’s Somali American population.

The Path Forward

By early February 2026, planned follow-up events showed organizers intended to keep up the pressure. On January 31, coalition partners organized over 300 “ICE Out of Everywhere” demonstrations as follow-up to the National Shutdown. Organizers reported that around 50,000 people joined the gathering in the Twin Cities.

Rather than demobilizing after partial federal concessions, the movement appeared to be expanding to national focus while keeping up the pressure in Minnesota.

Research on movement sustainability shows that campaigns typically experience initial growth, sustained effort over time, and eventual decline unless new events create new urgency.

The campaign had been energized by the traumatic killings of Good and Pretti as events that brought people out. By spring and summer 2026, without new federal violence or policy escalation, keeping people engaged would be difficult.

Other federal government responses beyond the agent withdrawal suggested potential escalation. Federal prosecutors had charged dozens of demonstrators with federal crimes, showing willingness to use the criminal justice system as a tool against the movement. The administration had shown willingness to use federal authority to force state and local cooperation through threats of funding withdrawal and other punitive measures.

If organizers succeeded in keeping coalitions together and keeping up the pressure through 2026, the movement could influence the 2026 midterm elections or 2028 presidential race. If federal violence resumed—if additional ICE shootings occurred or deportations of legal status immigrants accelerated—new triggering events could reignite explosive growth.

Conversely, if the movement fragmented, federal enforcement pressure intensified, and winter conditions in late 2026 discouraged continued street presence, the campaign could fade into the kind of inactivity that had marked immigration enforcement resistance between Occupy ICE Portland and the 2026 surge.

By early 2026, the ICE resistance had already demonstrated the power of organizing across many groups over weeks to force concessions from federal authorities. Whether that power would extend to achieving the movement’s ultimate objectives—complete federal withdrawal from Minnesota, criminal accountability for ICE violence, protections for immigrant students at institutions, and long-term ICE abolition—depended on organizing over time, managing the coalition, political opportunities, and the willingness of participants to stay committed through a long struggle.

The historical precedent of the 1980s Sanctuary Movement suggested that achieving these goals required persistence across multiple years and administrations. The coalition that brought 100,000 people into subzero streets, shut down 700 businesses, and forced a federal retreat had already proven that organized resistance could make immigration enforcement difficult enough to force tactical shifts from even a hostile administration.

Whether that tactical shift would become strategic transformation depended on what happened next—and whether the movement could keep up the kind of pressure that history suggested was necessary for fundamental change.

This article analyzes protest and activism tactics for educational purposes. We aim to contribute to effective and ethical efforts across the political spectrum, and we present diverse viewpoints and ideas without endorsement.