This is part of a series on nonviolent protest methods, which explains approaches and provides inspirational examples from history. For additional resources, please explore the Museum of Protest’s activist guides and view items in the collection.

This means stopping the usual flow of goods and services – blocking exports to, and often imports from, the target nation.

The goal is to economically isolate the target country and deny it the normal benefits of international commerce. Unlike routine trade disputes (which might involve tariffs or quotas), an embargo is a far more sweeping and punitive measure, typically enacted in response to major political or human rights issues.

When one or many governments coordinate an embargo, it becomes a tool of international statecraft to signal disapproval, demonstrate resolve, or compel change in a target country’s policies. In fact, an embargo is often described as a form of economic warfare used for political purposes – short of actual armed conflict.

It’s important to note that an embargo is usually a legal government order. It can be unilateral (one country acting alone) or multilateral (several nations or an international body acting together). A well-known example of a unilateral embargo is the decades-long United States embargo on Cuba, whereas the United Nations sanctions on apartheid-era South Africa or on Iraq in the 1990s were multilateral efforts. Embargoes can be comprehensive (covering all trade) or targeted to certain goods. For instance, an arms embargo cuts off weapons transfers, while a full trade embargo might block virtually all imports and exports.

By choking off trade, the imposing government(s) hope to create economic difficulties for the targeted regime, thereby pressuring its leaders to change course – all without firing a shot.

Embargoes as a Nonviolent Tool: How and When They Work Best

For governments, using an international trade embargo as a nonviolent tool requires careful strategy. A trade embargo can be most effective under certain conditions and with mindful execution. Here’s how and when this tactic tends to work best:

Broad International Support: Embargoes are far more potent when many countries participate together. If only one nation stops trading but others fill the gap, the pressure weakens. Multilateral embargoes (for example, those backed by the United Nations or a coalition of major trading nations) are hardest to evade. When there is a global consensus – say, condemning apartheid or stopping the spread of weapons – the target country finds itself isolated with few alternative trading partners. A unified front also lends moral legitimacy to the effort.

Clear Goals and Demands: An embargo is most effective when it is tied to specific, clear objectives. The targeted government should know what change is being sought or what behavior must stop in order for the embargo to be lifted. For instance, the goal might be ending a policy of segregation, withdrawing from a neighboring country’s territory, or complying with international law. Clear demands create pressure on the target regime to make a choice: persist in the objectionable behavior and suffer growing economic pain, or alter its behavior to have sanctions eased.

Moral and Legal Justification: Typically, trade embargoes are used in response to grave issues – such as human rights violations, aggression, or breaches of international norms. When the rationale is strong and broadly understood, it’s easier for governments to rally domestic and international support behind the embargo. A well-justified embargo (for example, opposing racial apartheid or stopping nuclear proliferation) becomes a powerful symbolic statement as well as a practical penalty. It tells the world that the issue is serious enough to warrant extraordinary nonviolent action by states.

Domestic and International Buy-in: Governments often impose embargoes under public pressure or moral outcry. Activist movements, humanitarian organizations, and public opinion can play a big role in pushing leaders to act. Once in place, the embargo’s success may depend on continued political will – leaders must resist the temptation to quietly loosen restrictions for economic gain. Citizen support helps ensure the embargo isn’t undermined by cheating or lobbying from affected businesses. (In the 1980s, for example, grassroots anti-apartheid campaigns in many Western countries strengthened their governments’ resolve to maintain sanctions against South Africa.)

Minimizing Humanitarian Harm: Although embargoes are nonviolent, they can still hurt ordinary people by causing shortages of food, medicine, or jobs. The most effective and principled use of this tool is when care is taken to limit unnecessary suffering – for instance, allowing humanitarian goods through, or targeting luxury goods and arms rather than essentials. This reduces backlash and moral dilemmas. A carefully calibrated embargo focuses pain on the ruling elite or military capabilities of the regime, not the general population. (In practice, this is difficult, as seen in some examples below, but it remains a crucial consideration.)

In summary, an international trade embargo works best as a nonviolent pressure tactic when it is widely supported, clearly purposed, and part of a broader strategy. Embargoes alone rarely topple a regime overnight, but they can significantly weaken a target government’s stability or international standing over time. They are often used in combination with other forms of nonviolent struggle – such as diplomatic isolation, internal protests, or boycotts by consumers and industries – to create a multi-faceted push for change. If misapplied or unsupported, however, embargoes can falter or even backfire, causing suffering without achieving the political goal. The following historical cases illustrate both the power and the complexities of this tactic.

Notable Historical Examples of Trade Embargoes in Action

Apartheid South Africa: Global Trade Sanctions to End Racial Segregation

One of the most cited successes of international economic pressure is the case of apartheid-era South Africa. Starting in the 1960s and escalating through the 1980s, a global movement emerged to isolate South Africa’s white-minority regime because of its oppressive system of racial segregation (apartheid). Activists around the world demanded that their governments boycott South African goods and cut off trade as a form of solidarity with the oppressed Black majority. Over time, many governments responded. The United Nations General Assembly began calling for sanctions as early as 1962, and although binding UN trade sanctions were thwarted by some great powers during the Cold War, a voluntary arms embargo was imposed in 1977.

By the mid-1980s, momentum for tougher action was overwhelming. The United States, for example, passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, banning new investment and many forms of trade with South Africa. Numerous countries in Europe, as well as Canada and Australia, also imposed trade restrictions or disinvested, reducing South Africa’s economic links to the world. These measures had a cumulative impact. South Africa’s economy, while not completely crippled, began to feel significant strain. Many large multinational companies pulled out of the country after 1986. By the late 1980s, South Africa was struggling under the weight of both internal unrest and external sanctions. The value of its currency fell, access to foreign loans dried up in 1985, and the country faced a credit crisis.

Importantly, the psychological and political effect of isolation grew: the white minority government faced a crisis of legitimacy as it became an international pariah. President F.W. de Klerk, who took office in 1989, later acknowledged that sanctions – along with internal resistance – were a factor in bringing the regime to the negotiating table. In fact, as negotiations to end apartheid began, many white South Africans supported reform partly because they knew it would lead to the lifting of boycotts and trade isolation that had tarnished their economy. Nelson Mandela, upon his release, also credited global solidarity campaigns for aiding the anti-apartheid struggle. In this case, the international trade embargoes (alongside cultural and sports boycotts) achieved their intended political impact: they pressed the South African government to dismantle apartheid, leading to the historic transition to majority rule in the early 1990s. This stands as a clear example of an economic embargo serving as a nonviolent tool for a humanitarian cause, albeit one that required sustained effort over many years.

The United States Embargo on Cuba: Decades of Isolation

If South Africa demonstrated the successful application of an embargo, the case of Cuba offers a more cautionary tale. In the early 1960s, after Fidel Castro’s revolution aligned Cuba with communism, the United States government imposed a sweeping trade embargo that remains largely in place to this day. Starting in 1960 with partial restrictions (after Cuba nationalized American-owned properties) and becoming a nearly total ban on trade by 1962, the U.S. embargo on Cuba aimed to pressure the Castro regime economically and politically. The hope was to force democratic reforms or even regime change by isolating Cuba from the huge U.S. market and investment. Over the ensuing decades, this embargo became one of the longest-running examples of economic noncooperation by a government.

The impact on Cuba has been profound. Cut off from its nearest wealthy neighbor, Cuba had to rely on aid and trade from the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, and when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Cuba’s economy plunged into a severe crisis. The United Nations estimates that the U.S. trade embargo has cost the Cuban economy over $130 billion USD in losses over six decades. Vital sectors like manufacturing, agriculture, and healthcare have been hampered by the inability to easily import machinery, parts, medicine, or sell goods in the U.S. market. For ordinary Cubans, the embargo has often meant shortages of supplies and a lower standard of living.

The embargo’s humanitarian impact has drawn widespread criticism – by the 2010s, virtually every nation (including close U.S. allies) voted at the UN in favor of resolutions condemning the embargo as overly harsh. Year after year since 1992, the UN General Assembly has called for the embargo’s end by an overwhelming majority, reflecting global consensus that this isolation has outlived its purpose.

Politically, however, the embargo did not achieve its original goal. The Communist government in Havana survived the economic pressure and remains in power. Rather than capitulate, Cuba adapted by diversifying trade partners (in Europe, Latin America, and Asia) and rallying nationalist sentiment against the U.S. “blockade” (as Cubans call it). While the embargo undeniably squeezed Cuba’s economy, it also gave the Cuban government a convenient scapegoat for its hardships, arguably entrenching authoritarian rule instead of weakening it. There have been some unintended consequences affecting the sanctioning country as well – for example, U.S. businesses lost opportunities, and American citizens were long restricted from travel to Cuba.

In recent years, there have been debates in the U.S. about whether this decades-long nonviolent pressure is still sensible. Even President Barack Obama noted that isolating Cuba failed to advance U.S. interests or democratic change, prompting a brief relaxation of some restrictions in 2015. (Those were tightened again later by a subsequent administration.) Today, the embargo on Cuba stands as a controversial example of an international trade embargo: it highlights that simply inflicting economic pain is no guarantee of political success. Instead, it shows how such an embargo can become a protracted standoff, with high human costs and ambiguous outcomes. The Cuban case encourages critical reflection on how nonviolent tools must be reassessed over time – and whether the suffering caused is proportional to the goals achieved.

Sanctions on Rhodesia (1965–1979): Pressuring an Illegal Regime

Another historic example of an international trade embargo comes from southern Africa in the 1960s–70s. In 1965, the white minority government of Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) unilaterally declared independence from Britain to avoid implementing Black majority rule. In response, Britain and eventually the United Nations Security Council imposed an international trade embargo on Rhodesia, the first time the UN had ever used mandatory economic sanctions against a state. This embargo aimed to deny legitimacy and choke off the economy of Rhodesia’s breakaway regime, thereby forcing it to accept democratic change. All UN member states were called upon to cease trade with Rhodesia – a bold move of collective nonviolent action at the governmental level.

The Rhodesian sanctions were sweeping on paper (covering imports and exports, including critical commodities like oil). Over the next few years, Rhodesia’s economy indeed suffered: exports fell drastically as the country lost access to markets for its key products like tobacco, sugar, and minerals. By one British report, just two years into the embargo, Rhodesia’s exports had plummeted by over 80% (from £137 million in 1965 to only £16 million by 1967) and imports dropped by 70%, indicating the regime’s severe isolation. The economic strain led to growing unrest among business owners and white farmers, and mounting unemployment among Africans in Rhodesia. In essence, the sanctions were biting hard.

However, the Rhodesian government, led by Ian Smith, held out far longer than expected. Some factors weakened the embargo’s full effect: neighboring South Africa (itself under apartheid rule) and the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola did not fully enforce the sanctions, allowing Rhodesia covert access to oil and trade via their territories. Additionally, certain strategic minerals like chrome found buyers on the black market or in sympathetic countries despite the UN ban.

Ultimately, the trade embargo on Rhodesia lasted well over a decade, until the late 1970s. It did not by itself end the regime, but it set the stage for change. Combined with an escalating guerrilla war by Rhodesian liberation movements and diplomatic pressure, the economic squeeze brought the Smith government to negotiate. In 1979, under the British-brokered Lancaster House Agreement, Rhodesia agreed to a transition to majority rule – effectively conceding to the core demand that had underlain the sanctions. When Rhodesia became the independent nation of Zimbabwe under majority-elected leadership in 1980, the UN lifted the embargo.

This case showed both the strengths and limitations of an international embargo. On one hand, sanctions clearly undermined the rebel government’s economic viability and international standing, signaling that the world would not accept an illegally segregated state. On the other hand, it demonstrated that determined regimes can sometimes withstand sanctions for long periods, especially if they find loopholes or allies. The Rhodesian experience provided a precedent for the UN’s use of sanctions in later conflicts, and a lesson that economic noncooperation by governments can contribute to change, even if patience is required. It remains a notable example of a trade embargo used in support of democratic and humanitarian principles.

Iraq in the 1990s: UN Embargo and Humanitarian Dilemma

Not all trade embargoes are celebrated in hindsight – some are remembered for their painful unintended consequences. A stark example is the United Nations trade embargo on Iraq from 1990 to 2003. When Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait in 1990, the UN Security Council reacted swiftly with Resolution 661, imposing a comprehensive sanctions regime on Iraq. This mandatory global embargo cut off nearly all trade to and from Iraq (with only minimal exceptions for medicine and later some food). The aim was to force Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and later to ensure Iraq’s disarmament (especially the elimination of weapons of mass destruction) after the Gulf War. It was one of the most extensive uses of economic sanctions ever, effectively sealing off Iraq’s economy from the world for over a decade.

In terms of achieving policy goals, the embargo had mixed results. Militarily, Iraq was expelled from Kuwait by force in 1991, but the sanctions remained in place long after, conditioning their end on Iraqi compliance with disarmament and other demands. Throughout the 1990s, the Iraqi regime did face serious constraints: its oil exports (the lifeblood of the economy) were halted for years, and later allowed only on a limited basis under a UN-supervised Oil-for-Food program. The embargo prevented Iraq from rebuilding its military capabilities to the level of its pre-1991 strength and eventually compelled the Iraqi government to cooperate (to a degree) with UN weapons inspectors. Some observers argue that the sustained pressure did succeed in crippling Saddam Hussein’s ambitions, as Iraq did not regain weapons of mass destruction – a fact verified by inspections and later events.

However, these strategic outcomes came at an enormous humanitarian cost. The Iraqi population suffered devastating effects from the trade cut-off. With imports of food, medicine, and infrastructure supplies heavily restricted, Iraq’s civilian infrastructure and health system collapsed. Studies and international observers noted sharp rises in malnutrition, disease, and child mortality during the sanctions period. By the mid-1990s, reports suggested that hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children had died due to malnutrition and lack of medical care as a result of the sanctions.

One analysis in 2020 described the Iraq sanctions as possibly “the worst humanitarian catastrophe ever imposed in the name of global governance”. This strong condemnation highlights that, while the embargo was intended as a nonviolent enforcement of international law, it inflicted suffering comparable to a war in humanitarian terms. The UN did adapt the policy over time – introducing Oil-for-Food in 1996 to allow Iraq to sell some oil in exchange for basic supplies – but the damage to an entire generation of Iraqis had been done. Moreover, the sanctions failed to force Saddam from power; his regime remained until it was ousted by military invasion in 2003, at which point the sanctions were finally lifted.

The Iraq embargo experience provoked a lot of soul-searching about sanctions as a tool. It led to efforts to design “smarter” sanctions (targeted at leaders and specific materials rather than entire economies) to avoid such broad suffering in the future. For the purpose of our discussion, Iraq’s case serves as a sobering reminder that even though an international trade embargo is technically nonviolent, it can have dire consequences for human life – raising ethical questions about how and when to use this tactic in protest against injustice.

The Power and Pitfalls of Trade Embargoes in Protest

These examples illustrate the dual nature of international trade embargoes. As a form of nonviolent action by governments, embargoes can be remarkably powerful. They allow nations to take a stand against wrongdoing – to do something more forceful than diplomatic condemnations, yet short of war. In the best cases, trade embargoes demonstrate global solidarity with oppressed people (as in apartheid South Africa), apply meaningful pressure on regimes to change abusive policies, and can help bring about negotiated solutions (as with Rhodesia’s transition to democracy). They also show the influence of protest beyond borders: activists and civil society can push their governments to align foreign policy with moral causes, effectively turning economic policy into a tool of resistance. In that sense, trade embargoes connect grassroots activism with high-level statecraft, expanding the repertoire of nonviolent struggle into the international arena.

However, as we have seen, embargoes also come with serious pitfalls and responsibilities. They are a blunt instrument; when broadly applied, the economic pain does not discriminate easily between rulers and ordinary citizens. This raises the risk of humanitarian fallout, as tragically demonstrated in Iraq and, to a lesser degree, in Cuba. An embargo can unintentionally hurt the very people one aims to help or save, if the targeted regime refuses to yield. Additionally, if not carefully coordinated, embargoes can fail – a leaky or half-hearted embargo may just prolong a conflict (as partial sanctions did in Rhodesia for many years) without forcing resolution.

For these reasons, modern policy debates emphasize making sanctions “smarter” – focusing on arms, luxury goods, or specific officials (through asset freezes and travel bans) rather than blanket trade bans. This evolution reflects an important ethical consideration for those who see embargoes as a protest tool: how to balance the need to exert pressure with the need to avoid undue harm.