This is part of a series on nonviolent protest methods, which explains approaches and provides inspirational examples from history. For additional resources, please explore the Museum of Protest’s activist guides and view items in the collection.

An international sellers’ embargo involves official sanctions or laws banning exports to the target nation.

Governments may enforce the embargo by requiring their domestic companies to stop shipments, by blacklisting traders who attempt to supply the target (an approach often paired with embargoes), and by penalizing those who violate the ban. Sometimes a single country initiates an embargo; other times a coalition of countries or an international body (like the United Nations) coordinates it.

The “international” aspect means that ideally multiple nations participate, making the embargo more effective by closing off alternative suppliers. For example, if Country A alone refuses to sell widgets to Country B, Country B might simply buy widgets from Country C instead. But if many countries join the embargo, Country B could struggle to find any widgets at all. The broader and more unified the participation, the greater the pressure on the target. This is why international sellers’ embargoes are often done through alliances or the UN – a united front prevents the targeted regime from easily evading the boycott.

Effectiveness depends on several factors. Not all embargoes succeed in forcing change, and some can have unintended consequences. To use this method most effectively as a form of nonviolent protest or pressure, governments typically consider the following:

Breadth of Participation: An embargo works best when it’s widely supported. If nearly every major seller refuses to trade with the target, the target country faces real shortages. However, if key countries refuse to join, the target can find loopholes. For instance, a UN embargo might falter if even a few neighboring states secretly continue trading. Broad international cooperation is crucial.

Critical Goods Targeted: Embargoes tend to focus on goods that the target country urgently needs and cannot easily produce itself. Oil, weaponry, industrial machinery, or grain are common examples. Denying these can cripple a nation’s war effort or economy. If the embargo only covers luxury items or non-essentials, it may not exert enough pressure.

Enforcement and Evasion: Governments must enforce embargo rules strictly. If smugglers or third-party countries can slip supplies through, the impact diminishes. In some historical cases, sanctions-busting trade continued clandestinely despite an official embargo. Effective monitoring (such as naval blockades or customs checks) and penalties for violators strengthen an embargo’s bite.

Duration and Persistence: Change often takes time. A short-lived embargo might not hurt enough to influence policy. Sustaining an embargo for months or years can steadily weaken the target’s economy or military. However, long durations also test the patience and unity of the countries enforcing it, especially if their own businesses or citizens feel the pinch.

Clear Goals and Exit Strategy: Successful embargoes usually have a clear objective (e.g. withdraw from occupied territory, end apartheid policies, etc.). This clarity helps the targeted country understand what it must do to get sanctions lifted. It also helps keep the embargoing countries focused. Without clear goals, embargoes can drag on without resolution (e.g., the decades-long U.S. embargo on Cuba, which has failed to prompt regime change).

Impact on the Target vs. Population: Strategically, an embargo should pressure the leaders or power structure of the target country. If it only harms the general population while the ruling elite remain insulated, it might backfire. Suffering civilians may rally around their government out of defiance, or the humanitarian costs may cause international sympathy for the target. An effective embargo often seeks to hit the target’s economy where it hurts the leadership (such as revenue or military capability) without excessive collateral damage to ordinary people.

An international sellers’ embargo is a delicate balancing act. It can be a potent nonviolent weapon – sometimes even nicknamed the “economic weapon” – that nations wield to uphold international norms or support protest movements abroad. But its success is far from guaranteed. To understand how this method plays out, it helps to look at historical examples. There have been notable cases across different regions and eras, with varying outcomes. Below, we examine several major instances of international sellers’ embargoes, highlighting what happened and why some achieved their aims while others did not.

Historical Examples of International Sellers’ Embargoes

League of Nations Embargo on Italy (1935–1936)

One early attempt at an international sellers’ embargo was during the Abyssinia Crisis of 1935, when Fascist Italy invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia). The invasion was widely condemned as an act of aggression. In response, the newly formed League of Nations – the international body preceding the UN – voted to impose economic sanctions on Italy. This was essentially a multilateral embargo: League members agreed to stop selling certain goods to Italy to pressure Mussolini’s regime to halt its war.

However, this embargo is often cited as an example of a less effective case. The League’s sanctions were incomplete and not fully enforced. Notably, they failed to include Italy’s most crucial import – oil. Vital materials like oil, steel, and coal were left off the embargo list due to reluctance by major powers to hurt their own trade interests.

Additionally, not all countries participated wholeheartedly. Some nations outside the League (and even some within it) continued trading with Italy. The United States, for example, was not a League member and did not formally join the sanctions, allowing U.S. oil to still reach Italy. Britain and France, while officially supporting sanctions, did not block Italy’s access to the Suez Canal, which was a key route for supplying the Italian war effort.

As a result of these gaps, Italy was able to secure enough fuel and resources to continue its campaign in Ethiopia. Mussolini’s forces conquered Abyssinia by May 1936, effectively ignoring the League’s pressure. In the end, the embargo was dropped after Italy’s victory.

Far from stopping aggression, the half-hearted embargo only demonstrated the weakness of international resolve. The League of Nations was discredited as it became clear that without full commitment (and without including critical commodities like oil), the sanctions could be defied.

This case showed that a sellers’ embargo, if incomplete, may fail to achieve its goal – in this instance, it neither prevented war nor reversed Italy’s annexation of Ethiopia. It underscored the lesson that an embargo must be comprehensive and universally enforced to be truly effective.

U.S. Oil Embargo on Japan (1940–1941)

Another historic example – and a cautionary tale – is the oil embargo against Japan before World War II. In 1940–1941, the United States and some allied nations took steps to cut off strategic materials to Imperial Japan, hoping to curb Japanese military expansion in Asia. Japan was heavily reliant on imported oil, steel, and scrap iron, much of which came from the U.S.

At the time, Japan was waging an aggressive war in China and had just occupied French Indochina, threatening European colonies in Southeast Asia. In July 1941, in protest of these actions, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt froze Japanese assets and effectively banned oil exports to Japan.

This international sellers’ embargo (joined by the British and the Dutch, who controlled oil-rich Indonesia) aimed to stop fuel shipments and paralyze Japan’s war machinery. The embargo certainly had impact – it cut off about 80% of Japan’s oil supply. But rather than forcing Japan to back down, it had an unintended and violent outcome.

Deprived of oil for its navy and industry, Japan’s leadership viewed the embargo as an existential threat. Instead of yielding to U.S. demands (which included withdrawing from China), Japan chose to break the encirclement by force. As historians note, the U.S. oil embargo pushed Japan to plan a massive military response.

In December 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor – dragging the United States into World War II – and simultaneously struck European colonial targets in Southeast Asia to seize the oil and resources it could no longer buy.

In this case, the international sellers’ embargo failed to achieve the desired peaceful change; on the contrary, it escalated into full-scale war. The “economic weapon” provoked a military counterblow.

The lesson often drawn from 1941 is that an embargo, if perceived by the target regime as strangulation, may trigger desperate measures. Japan’s leaders saw the oil cutoff as intolerable, choosing a risky war rather than compliance. This example highlights a key strategic consideration: nonviolent pressure can backfire if the target decides that fighting is preferable to giving in. It’s a reminder that while embargoes are nonviolent in themselves, they exist in a larger political context that can turn violent if mismanaged.

Sanctions on White-Minority Rule in Southern Africa (1960s–1980s)

International sellers’ embargoes have also been used as tools to oppose colonial or racist regimes. Two notable cases in southern Africa involved white-minority governments: Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) and apartheid-era South Africa. The global community, in solidarity with oppressed African majorities, employed embargoes to pressure these regimes over several decades – with mixed but ultimately significant results.

Rhodesia (1965–1979): In 1965 the minority white government of Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence from Britain, entrenching minority rule and rejecting demands for majority (black) rule. In response, the United Kingdom and the United Nations led the world in imposing sanctions on Rhodesia – the first time the UN had ever mandated comprehensive economic sanctions on a state. This included an international sellers’ embargo on oil and arms to Rhodesia, among other trade bans.

The idea was to isolate Rhodesia’s economy and make it impossible for the regime to sustain itself. While the sanctions added pressure, for many years they were only partially effective. Rhodesia’s neighbors, apartheid South Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique, continued to trade with Rhodesia and supply it with oil despite the UN embargo.

Some other countries and corporations also engaged in clandestine trade (so-called “sanctions busting”). The result was that Rhodesia’s economy survived the embargo with only moderate hardship through the late 1960s and early 1970s. By one assessment a decade in, Rhodesia’s economy was still among the stronger ones in sub-Saharan Africa despite the sanctions. The embargo alone did not force immediate change in Rhodesia’s politics.

However, the situation evolved. In the mid-1970s, Portugal’s dictatorship fell, leading Mozambique to cut off sanction evasion routes, and pressure mounted on South Africa to stop propping up Rhodesia. At the same time, an escalating guerrilla war by Rhodesian liberation fighters made the status quo costly. By the late 1970s, the economic sanctions began having a noticeable effect in combination with these factors. Shortages of fuel and spare parts bit deeper.

Facing growing isolation and struggle, the Rhodesian government finally agreed to negotiate. In 1979, a peace agreement was reached and in 1980 Rhodesia transitioned to majority rule as the new nation of Zimbabwe.

In sum, the Rhodesia embargo eventually achieved its aim, but only after 15 years and in tandem with armed resistance and geopolitical shifts. It showed that a sellers’ embargo can work, but slow and uneven enforcement can greatly delay its impact.

South Africa (1970s–1990s): A more famous example is the international campaign against South Africa’s apartheid system of racial segregation. Here, governments around the world – prodded by public opinion and activist movements – increasingly turned to economic sanctions as a nonviolent means of protest.

Starting in the 1960s, some individual countries banned certain trade with South Africa (for instance, a voluntary British arms embargo in 1964, and others banning South African goods). The United Nations Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa in 1977, prohibiting all UN members from selling weapons to the apartheid regime.

Later, in the mid-1980s, many Western nations like the United States and members of the European Community enacted sweeping trade embargoes, blocking new investments and banning the sale of key commodities (like oil equipment) to South Africa. In 1987 the UN General Assembly also adopted a voluntary international oil embargo against South Africa, recognizing that oil was a lifeline of the economy and military.

Though South Africa was resource-rich in some areas (gold, minerals), it depended entirely on imports for oil – making the oil embargo a potentially “critical goods” cutoff. The apartheid government tried to mitigate this by developing synthetic fuel from coal and by covertly importing oil, but the net effect of sanctions was substantial.

Over time, the international sellers’ embargoes, coupled with financial sanctions and cultural isolation, inflicted economic strain and dented the confidence of South African businesses and the white public. South Africa found it harder to obtain advanced technology and armaments, which slowed the modernization of its military.

More broadly, as sanctions tightened in the 1980s, foreign investment dried up and the cost of doing business grew. The South African currency fell and the economy stagnated under the weight of isolation.

By the end of the 1980s, these pressures helped create a tipping point. In 1990, President F.W. de Klerk, the South African leader at the time, acknowledged that international sanctions were making the apartheid system economically unsustainable. That year, he took dramatic steps: releasing Nelson Mandela from prison and beginning negotiations to dismantle apartheid.

In the following years, apartheid laws were repealed and South Africa moved toward multiracial democracy, culminating in the historic 1994 elections that brought Mandela to power. Nelson Mandela himself later affirmed the impact of the embargoes and sanctions, saying “Oh, there is no doubt” that economic sanctions helped end apartheid.

This stands as a successful example of an international sellers’ embargo contributing to political change. The combination of moral outrage, grassroots boycotts, and official government embargoes created a chokehold that, alongside internal resistance, forced one of Africa’s most repressive regimes to relent.

The 1973–1974 Arab Oil Embargo

Perhaps the most famous international sellers’ embargo was the Arab oil embargo of 1973–74. This case was unique in that it was a collective action by oil-producing countries to protest the policies of Western nations. It wasn’t organized by the UN or a world body, but rather by a coalition of Middle Eastern governments using their economic clout in oil. Despite that, it fits the definition of an international sellers’ embargo perfectly: they stopped selling a crucial product (crude oil) to certain countries as a form of nonviolent coercion.

Context: In October 1973, a war erupted in the Middle East (the Yom Kippur War), pitting Israel against Egypt and Syria. The United States and some Western countries supported Israel with arms and supplies. In retaliation, the Arab members of OPEC (led by Saudi Arabia, and including other Gulf states as well as Egypt and Syria) decided to weaponize their oil exports. In October 1973 they announced an embargo on oil shipments to the United States and other nations backing Israel, such as the Netherlands, Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. This action is often referred to as the “Arab oil embargo.” It was both a protest against Western support for Israel and an attempt to pressure those countries into pushing Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab lands.

Impact: The oil embargo had an immediate and dramatic effect worldwide. The participating Arab nations were a dominant source of the world’s petroleum. By turning off the tap, they caused a severe oil supply shock. In a matter of months, the price of oil skyrocketed – roughly quadrupling by early 1974. The sudden shortage led to fuel crises in the embargoed countries. For example, in the United States drivers faced long lines and rationing at gas stations. Western Europe and Japan also reeled from spiking energy costs.

This period became known as the First Oil Crisis, and it triggered a wider economic downturn. The U.S. economy, for instance, shrank by an estimated 2.5% as a result of the oil shock, with surging inflation and unemployment, sliding into a serious recession. Globally, the embargo contributed to “stagflation” – stagnant growth combined with high inflation – that marked much of the 1970s in oil-importing nations.

Politically, the Arab oil embargo succeeded in drawing intense attention to Arab grievances. It put significant pressure on the targeted governments to reconsider their Middle East policies. In fact, one of the outcomes was that the United States began more active diplomacy to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. By March 1974, with U.S. mediation, initial disengagement agreements were reached between Israel and Egypt/Syria, and the Arab producers lifted the embargo on the U.S. (though some Arab states continued to embargo other countries like South Africa for a longer period).

The crisis also had a lasting legacy: Western nations made strategic changes, such as establishing the International Energy Agency to coordinate responses to oil shocks and creating strategic petroleum reserves to cushion against future embargoes. They also invested in energy efficiency and alternative energy, reducing vulnerability.

From the Arab perspective, the oil embargo was a show of newfound power – using the “oil weapon” to assert political demands. It was successful in the short term as a dramatic protest that forced the world to listen and temporarily altered policies (for example, Europe became more openly critical of Israel’s occupation, and the U.S. pressed Israel into negotiations). However, it had limitations: it did not achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace or a long-term change in U.S. support for Israel. Moreover, by spurring consumers to find alternatives, the embargo arguably weakened the Arab leverage over time – a “Pyrrhic victory” as one analysis called it.

After 1974, fearing further loss of market share, OPEC nations were cautious about using an outright embargo again; the 1973 event remains unique. Still, as an international sellers’ embargo, the Arab oil embargo demonstrated how profoundly effective such a tactic can be when the commodity involved is truly essential and the producers remain unified (at least for the duration of the crisis).

The 1980 Grain Embargo on the Soviet Union

International sellers’ embargoes are not only about oil or arms; food can be a weapon too. A notable case was the U.S.-led grain embargo against the Soviet Union in 1980.

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, prompting worldwide condemnation. As part of its response, U.S. President Jimmy Carter in early 1980 announced that the United States would halt shipments of grain (mainly wheat and corn) to the USSR. At that time, the Soviet Union relied on imports for a substantial portion of its grain needs to feed its population and livestock, and the U.S. was a major supplier. The embargo was intended as a punitive nonviolent sanction – to pressure the Soviet leadership by creating food supply difficulties and make the cost of their Afghanistan intervention unacceptably high.

What happened, however, illustrates how an embargo can miss its mark if not supported globally. The U.S. embargo initially involved around 17 million tons of grain that were contracted for delivery but got canceled. This sudden cut did hurt the Soviets on paper. But very quickly, other grain-exporting nations stepped in. Countries like Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Australia increased their grain sales to the USSR.

With multiple alternative suppliers in the global market, the Soviet Union was able to buy much of the grain it needed elsewhere, albeit sometimes at slightly higher prices. In the end, the Soviets imported only somewhat less grain than planned; their livestock herds and bread lines were inconvenienced but not devastated.

On the flip side, American farmers were hard hit. Prices for U.S. grain plummeted due to the sudden oversupply when the Soviet orders were withdrawn. Many U.S. farmers saw their incomes crash, and rural communities suffered.

The embargo didn’t compel any change in Soviet military policy in Afghanistan (the Red Army remained there for a decade). Domestic pressure from the angry farm sector in the U.S. grew, and after Carter lost the 1980 election, the new President Ronald Reagan lifted the grain embargo in 1981.

The episode ended up being seen as a policy failure or even a blunder. As one Kansas farmer recalled, “the embargo missed its target… what it did was send a clear signal to the world that we [the US] can’t be counted on as a reliable supplier”. In other words, it arguably hurt U.S. credibility more than Soviet interests. Indeed, some analysts note it contributed to the worst farm crisis in the U.S. since the Great Depression, as the 1980s were a rough time for American agriculture in part due to lost markets and low prices.

The 1980 Soviet grain embargo serves as a cautionary example that a unilateral sellers’ embargo, without broad international join-in, can be easily undermined. It underscores the earlier point: breadth of participation is vital. In a globalized market, if one major seller steps out, others may leap in to take the business. It also shows that economic weapons can backfire economically on the user, creating political fallout at home (in this case, among U.S. farmers). The embargo’s failure helped solidify a later reluctance by the U.S. to use food exports as a strategic weapon – “food power” turned out to have limits.

The Long-Term U.S. Embargo on Cuba (1960–Present)

A final example to consider is the United States’ embargo on Cuba, which began in the early 1960s and in various forms continues to this day. This is one of the longest-running instances of an international sellers’ (and buyers’) embargo, notable for its persistence and controversial effectiveness.

Starting after Cuba’s 1959 communist revolution, the U.S. gradually imposed a complete ban on trade with Cuba – American companies were forbidden to sell any products to Cuba (and also barred from importing Cuban goods). The goal was to isolate Cuba’s new government economically and pressure it into political change or even collapse. Over the decades, the U.S. also pressured allied countries to limit trade with Cuba, aiming for a wider international embargo.

In the 1960s, the U.S. had some success convincing the Organization of American States to join a collective embargo in the Western Hemisphere. But by the 1970s and onward, most other countries abandoned the Cuba embargo, leaving the United States largely alone in this policy.

After more than 60 years, the U.S. embargo on Cuba is still in place – and it is widely regarded as having failed to achieve its original aims. The Cuban communist government has remained in power throughout, and there has been no regime change or full democratization as the embargo’s architects had hoped. A 2020 analysis bluntly noted: “The U.S. embargo has endured for 60 years, failing in its initial goal of inciting regime change and promoting democracy.”.

What the embargo did do was contribute to Cuba’s economic difficulties; Cuba’s economy suffered stagnation, shortages, and underdevelopment in many areas, though the Cuban government adapted by seeking other trading partners (like the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and later allies such as Venezuela and China).

The lack of broad international participation (most of Europe, Canada, Latin America, and others trade with Cuba freely) meant Cuba was not completely isolated – it could still obtain goods from elsewhere, limiting the embargo’s impact to the loss of the U.S. market and U.S. goods. In fact, the U.N. General Assembly has for decades annually condemned the U.S. embargo, with nearly all member states voting against it as outdated and harmful to Cuban civilians.

From a strategic viewpoint, the Cuba embargo illustrates how an international sellers’ boycott can stall into a long stalemate. The U.S. stuck with it, hoping over time pressure would accumulate, but the Cuban regime proved resilient and used the embargo as a propaganda tool (“blaming the Yankee blockade” for hardships and rallying nationalist sentiment). As years passed, the embargo arguably became counterproductive to its stated goals – entrenching attitudes on both sides.

Even U.S. officials have at times questioned its utility. Small relaxations occurred under President Obama in the 2010s (recognizing that isolation hadn’t worked), though some restrictions were later tightened again. To this day, the embargo remains one of the most enduring trade bans in history, serving as a case study in the limits of economic coercion when not paired with diplomatic engagement or multilateral support.

Why Some Embargoes Succeed and Others Fail

Looking across these examples – from Italy to South Africa to Cuba – certain patterns emerge regarding what contributes to the success or failure of an international sellers’ embargo:

International Unity vs. Evasion: The successful cases (like the arms embargo on South Africa or the oil embargo in 1973, at least in its immediate impact) featured a high degree of coordination among key players. In contrast, failures like the grain embargo or the partial sanctions on Italy/Rhodesia saw major leaks. If even a few significant suppliers refuse to cooperate, the target can find work-arounds. Broad unity closes off escape valves; disunity undermines the effort.

Leverage and Critical Imports: Embargoes are most potent when they deny something the target cannot live without. Oil in 1973 or arms to South Africa hit pressure points. In Rhodesia, oil was critical, but South Africa filled the gap for a time. In Cuba’s case, the Soviet Union’s aid substituted for lost U.S. trade during the Cold War. When targets have alternative sources or can develop substitutes (like Japan seeking oil in conquest, or South Africa making synthetic fuel), the leverage weakens. Effective embargoes target commodities where the senders have a near-monopoly or the target is uniquely vulnerable.

Clarity of Purpose and Conditionality: When the target knows exactly what action will lead to the embargo being lifted, it has a clear incentive to comply. The Arab oil embargo had a clear political demand (withdraw support for Israel’s post-1967 borders), and it was lifted when partial concessions were perceived. The South Africa sanctions aimed to end apartheid, and indeed were lifted as apartheid was dismantled. On the other hand, an embargo that becomes a blanket punishment without clear terms (e.g. the U.S. embargo on Cuba at times) offers the target no obvious path to redemption short of regime collapse. That can reduce the target’s willingness to compromise, since there’s nothing short of total surrender that satisfies the embargoing side.

Internal Pressure on Target Regime: A crucial factor is whether the embargo changes the cost-benefit calculus of the target’s own leadership and key supporters. In South Africa, white business owners and the political elite began to fear economic ruin and international isolation, which made them more receptive to reform. In the Soviet grain case, the Soviet leadership was able to shield its public from major food shortages, so they felt little domestic pressure to heed the U.S. demands. In Cuba, the government managed to maintain control and blame hardships on the U.S., so internal opposition did not grow enough to force change (and dissent was repressed). Embargoes often work in tandem with internal dissent: if the population or influential groups in the target country start agitating for policy change because of the embargo’s pain, the government feels the heat. Without internal pressure, a regime can sometimes endure sanctions indefinitely, as seen in North Korea or Cuba.

Duration and Patience: Nonviolent coercion is usually not swift. Successful embargo campaigns can take years. This requires patience and political will from the enforcing countries. In a democracy, that means keeping public opinion and interest aligned with the policy despite any economic side effects at home. In the Rhodesia case, the international community stayed the course for over a decade until results showed. Where patience runs out early (the grain embargo was rescinded in just one year due to domestic backlash), the tactic may be abandoned before it ever had a chance to bite. Thus, maintaining resolve is key – but also knowing when to adjust course if it’s clearly not working.

Risk of Escalation: The Japan 1941 case underscores that an embargo can be perceived as an act of economic warfare. If the target feels cornered and powerful enough, it may retaliate violently rather than submit. Most modern embargo scenarios involve the UN or major powers against a smaller state, which reduces the chance of the target successfully lashing out (South Africa, for example, could not “fight back” against the whole world, and Iraq in 1990 was already beaten militarily when sanctions continued). But whenever an embargo is applied, especially in a tense security context, there is a consideration: might this provoke a worse conflict? Generally, nations use embargoes as an alternative to war – a last step before considering force. The hope is the target yields; the danger is the target sees it as the first shot of war. Managing communications and off-ramps is thus important to embargo strategy.