This is part of a series on nonviolent protest methods, which explains approaches and provides inspirational examples from history. For additional resources, please explore the Museum of Protest’s activist guides and view items in the collection.

An international buyers’ embargo is a form of economic noncooperation in which one or more governments refuse to purchase goods or resources from a targeted country as a way to exert pressure.

How it works: By denying a country access to international buyers for its products, an international buyers’ embargo aims to hit the target where it hurts most – its revenue. Many countries depend on exporting key commodities (such as oil, minerals, or agricultural goods) to earn income. If a coalition of other nations (acting individually or through an international body) prohibits the import of those goods, the target country loses markets for its exports. The resulting economic pain is intended to compel the target’s government to change a problematic policy or behavior without resorting to military force. In this way, the embargo becomes a tool of protest or coercion: it signals strong disapproval of the target regime’s actions while applying economic pressure in a nonviolent manner.

Why governments use it: An international buyers’ embargo is typically used when diplomatic criticism alone is ineffective and more forceful options (like armed intervention) are undesirable or illegal. By coordinating their refusal to import from the offending state, governments can collectively sanction the target for human rights abuses, aggression, or other violations of international norms. This form of economic pressure is meant to undermine the target’s economy and political standing until it reforms its behavior. Unlike a private consumer boycott (which is driven by individual ethics), a buyers’ embargo is an official policy action – often part of a broader sanctions package – employed by governments as an instrument of foreign policy and protest.

Strategies for Effective Use of an Embargo

Not all embargoes are successful. History shows that some have real impact while others achieve little. To maximize effectiveness, governments have learned several best practices:

Act in Unity (Multilateral Coordination)

Embargoes work best when many nations participate. If only one country stops buying from the target, the target can often find alternative buyers elsewhere, blunting the impact. Broad international cooperation closes off those escape routes. Research confirms that multilateral sanctions tend to be far more effective than unilateral ones, especially when backed by an international organization like the United Nations. A unified front also signals overwhelming moral and political pressure. For example, United Nations–mandated trade embargoes carry the weight of the global community and have a higher success rate than solo efforts.

Target Key Exports and Vulnerabilities

An embargo should focus on the commodities most critical to the target country’s economy. Sanctions that cut off a major source of foreign revenue create leverage. Studies find that sanction regimes have a higher success rate when they hit a key export sector of the target. In practical terms, this means identifying the exports (oil, minerals, cash crops, etc.) that generate the bulk of the target’s income and shutting down the target’s access to its biggest markets for those goods. The economic shock from losing those buyers must be large and rapid – successful cases often inflicted costs exceeding 2% of the target’s GDP within a short time, whereas failed cases barely dented 1%.

Ensure Clear Goals and Conditions

An international buyers’ embargo is most effective as a negotiating tool when the target government understands exactly what it needs to do to get the embargo lifted. Clear objectives (e.g. “end apartheid policies” or “withdraw forces from neighboring country”) give the target a way out and make the pressure more compelling. Without clear “off-ramps,” the target may dig in, and sanctioning countries might struggle with when to lift the embargo. Policymakers and scholars stress that sanctions should include explicit criteria or incentives for compliance – this increases the likelihood of the target conceding and prevents the embargo from becoming an open-ended punishment. In essence, link the embargo to specific, achievable policy changes in the target country.

Combine with Diplomacy and Other Measures

An embargo is rarely a silver bullet on its own. It works best in tandem with other diplomatic or economic actions. For instance, governments often pair trade embargoes with freezing of assets, travel bans on leaders, or diplomatic isolation of the regime. The embargo creates economic strain while diplomacy offers a path to relief, striking a balance of pressure and dialogue. Sometimes the mere threat of an embargo can strengthen a negotiator’s hand. In other cases, covert assistance to opposition groups or information campaigns may complement the embargo by undermining the target regime’s internal support. The overall strategy should be coherent: sanctions pressure is one pillar of a broader approach to influence the target.

Maintain Domestic and International Support

Because embargoes can have side effects (like higher prices or lost business for the sanctioning countries), sustaining political will is crucial. Leaders must prepare their public to endure some inconvenience or economic cost as the price of standing on principle. Ideally, the burden is shared across the coalition to minimize any one country’s sacrifice. When sanctions are carefully crafted to limit the pain on one’s own citizens and businesses (for example, by exempting certain essential goods or giving companies time to adjust), it’s easier for governments to stay the course. Regular communication about the embargo’s purpose and progress can help keep public opinion on board until the objectives are met.

By following these guidelines – broad cooperation, strategic targeting, clear objectives, complementary diplomacy, and sustained resolve – governments greatly improve the chances that an international buyers’ embargo will achieve its desired outcome. Even then, success is not guaranteed; much depends on the context, which is why examining historical examples is so important.

Historical Examples and Their Impact

Throughout modern history, governments have employed international buyers’ embargoes in a number of prominent conflicts and human rights struggles. Below we explore several notable cases, highlighting the context, actors, goals, and outcomes to understand how this protest method can make an impact (or sometimes fall short).

League of Nations Embargo on Italy (1935–1936)

Context & Goal: In 1935, Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini invaded Ethiopia (then Abyssinia), an act of unprovoked aggression. In response, the League of Nations (the intergovernmental precursor to the UN) voted to impose sanctions on Italy. The goal was to pressure Italy to halt its war and withdraw, by imposing economic pain and international condemnation short of military force.

Actions Taken: The League’s sanctions included an embargo on importing Italian goods – member countries were forbidden from buying products originating from Italy or its colonies. This was a classic international buyers’ embargo: by cutting off foreign markets for Italian exports, the League hoped to strain Italy’s economy. In addition, the League members banned arms sales to Italy and restricted some exports of raw materials to Italy (a sellers’ embargo on certain war-related supplies).

Effectiveness & Limitations: In practice, these measures had only partial effect. While Italy did face economic difficulties (its foreign reserves shrank and the lira currency came under pressure), the sanctions package was far from complete. Crucially, the League excluded key commodities like coal, steel, and oil from the embargo, fearing that banning those would be too hard to enforce or would drive Italy to trade with non-League nations. The omissions proved fatal to the effort – Mussolini’s war machine still obtained the fuel and resources it needed. British statesman Winston Churchill famously observed that the League’s half-hearted embargo spared almost everything important to Italy’s war effort, calling the sanctions “not real sanctions to paralyze the aggressor, but merely such half-hearted sanctions as the aggressor would tolerate.”

In the end, Italy succeeded in conquering Ethiopia by 1936 despite the embargo. The League’s first attempt at collective economic pressure thus failed to stop the aggression. It did, however, serve as a sobering lesson: sanctions must be comprehensive and strongly enforced to stand a chance at success. The Italian case highlighted the importance of closing loopholes (like oil) and securing full cooperation; even a well-intentioned buyers’ embargo will falter if it leaves the target substantial alternatives.

United Nations Sanctions on Rhodesia (1965–1979)

Context & Goal: On November 11, 1965, the white-minority regime in Southern Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) unilaterally declared independence from Britain, entrenching minority rule and defying the decolonization process. In response, Britain and the international community sought to isolate Rhodesia’s regime (led by Ian Smith) until it agreed to majority rule. The goal of the sanctions was to make Rhodesia’s unilateral independence economically unsustainable and force a return to lawful governance under majority (African) rights.

Actions Taken: The United Kingdom initially led with an embargo on buying key Rhodesian exports. Britain and other countries banned the import of Rhodesian products like sugar, tobacco, chrome, and other goods, and also initiated an oil-buying boycott to cut off Rhodesia’s fuel supply. These were the first steps of the international buyers’ embargo. Soon after, the United Nations Security Council went further: in 1966 and 1968 it passed resolutions requiring all UN member states to cease virtually all trade with Rhodesia, the first mandatory trade sanctions in UN history. In effect, the UN called for a worldwide embargo on buying and selling Rhodesian goods – a comprehensive trade quarantine to isolate the rebel regime.

Effectiveness & Outcome: The Rhodesia embargo had a mixed record. On one hand, it did impose significant economic strain: the country’s export earnings dropped as major markets vanished. By one UN estimate, the sanctions hit about 90% of Rhodesia’s exports. On the other hand, enforcement was uneven, and Rhodesia found ways to survive. Apartheid South Africa and Portugal (which controlled Mozambique, Rhodesia’s outlet to the sea) chose not to honor the UN embargo and continued trading with Rhodesia, providing it covert routes to sell its goods and obtain essentials like oil. Some other countries also quietly engaged in “sanctions-busting” trade. This leakage meant that, for many years, the economic squeeze was not tight enough to topple the regime.

Indeed, throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, Rhodesia’s economy muddled through, and the government remained defiant, declaring that sanctions would never force them to yield. However, over time the pressure did mount. The combination of international sanctions, diplomatic isolation, guerrilla warfare by Rhodesian liberation movements, and changing geopolitics (Portugal’s collapse in 1974 ended a key ally for Rhodesia) gradually undermined the regime. By the late 1970s, Rhodesia was economically and politically cornered. In 1979, under South African prodding and with its war against guerrillas stalemated, the white government entered negotiations. The result was the Lancaster House Agreement, leading to genuine democratic elections and the recognized independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.

The embargo’s role in this outcome is debated – it alone did not force the breakthrough, but it was a crucial element of the pincer. Rhodesia’s leaders themselves acknowledged that ending sanctions was a major incentive for reaching a settlement. In summary, the Rhodesian buyers’ embargo made a clear impact over the long run, though its effectiveness was limited by enforcement gaps. It demonstrated that broad, sustained sanctions can eventually wear down an unrecognized regime, especially when paired with internal resistance, but also that determined embargo-breaking by a target’s neighbors can significantly delay the impact.

Anti-Apartheid Embargoes on South Africa (1980s)

Context & Goal: During the 1970s and 1980s, apartheid South Africa became an international pariah due to its institutionalized racial segregation and oppression of the Black majority. South African anti-apartheid activists called for global support, and gradually a worldwide movement of sanctions and boycotts took shape. The goal of these measures was to pressure the South African government to dismantle apartheid and move toward majority rule, by isolating it economically and culturally.

Actions Taken: The campaign against apartheid included many facets – from sports and academic boycotts to corporate disinvestment – but importantly, governments also imposed official trade embargoes as leverage. For example, numerous countries banned the import of South African products (an international buyers’ embargo in effect). In 1985, Ireland went so far as to institute a total ban on South African imports following public protests – even a single shop worker’s refusal to handle South African fruit escalated into a nationwide stance. The United States, after much activism and a congressional override of President Reagan’s veto, passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, which banned imports of key South African commodities (like iron, steel, coal, and agricultural goods) and prohibited new American investment in South Africa. The European Community and Commonwealth countries also adopted various sanctions around this time. Cumulatively, by the late 1980s South Africa faced a broad buyers’ embargo on its goods, alongside an arms embargo and financial sanctions.

Impact: The international buyers’ embargo against South Africa is often cited as an example of sanctions contributing to historic change. By choking off markets for South African exports and deterring foreign investment, the embargoes helped push the apartheid regime toward a financial and political crisis. White South African businesses and the government began to feel the squeeze: for instance, foreign banks called in loans in 1985, sending a clear signal that the status quo was untenable. The rub was that none of these events alone toppled apartheid – internal resistance was the decisive driver (e.g. the Soweto uprisings and widespread Black protests made the country “ungovernable” in many areas). Yet, the external isolation reinforced the internal struggle. It “made its mark on South Africans,” as one account notes, by confronting white citizens and leaders with the moral repudiation of their system.

Being shut out of international trade, sports, and culture increasingly hurt the pride and prosperity of ordinary white South Africans, which in turn eroded their support for apartheid. By the time President F.W. de Klerk moved to release Nelson Mandela and negotiate an end to apartheid in 1990, a major selling point to his white constituency was that ending apartheid would mean an end to boycotts and sanctions – a path back to normal economic life. Indeed, the prospect of regaining access to global markets and investment was a powerful incentive for change.

In hindsight, the anti-apartheid embargoes were effective in tandem with other forces. They did not instantly fell the regime, but they amplified the costs of apartheid and hastened its demise. They also demonstrated the importance of moral legitimacy: the boycott movement had credibility largely because it was driven by South Africans themselves (the oppressed appealed for it), which encouraged foreign governments to follow suit in a nonpartisan way. While the embargoes likely also caused some economic hardship for Black South Africans (as jobs were lost when trade shrank), the liberation movement broadly supported sanctions as a necessary pressure. Ultimately, South Africa’s case showed that a well-targeted buyers’ embargo, sustained over years and buttressed by popular support, can help bring a recalcitrant government to the negotiating table.

The Iran Oil Embargo and Nuclear Deal (2010s)

Context & Goal: In the 2000s, Iran’s nuclear program prompted growing international concern that Tehran was seeking the capability to build nuclear weapons. Various diplomatic efforts failed to halt Iran’s uranium enrichment, so major powers turned to tougher sanctions. The goal was to coerce Iran into restricting its nuclear program to purely peaceful activities, by imposing severe economic penalties. A central part of this strategy was an international buyers’ embargo on Iranian oil – the lifeblood of Iran’s economy.

Actions Taken: Beginning around 2010 and escalating by 2012, the United States and European Union led a coordinated campaign to cut off Iran’s oil exports. The EU, then one of Iran’s biggest customers, agreed in January 2012 to ban all imports of Iranian oil (effective July that year) and also froze the assets of Iran’s central bank. At the same time, the U.S. used its financial clout to pressure other countries (like Japan, South Korea, India, and China) to sharply reduce their purchases of Iranian petroleum. Perhaps most devastating, in March 2012 Iran was disconnected from the SWIFT international banking network, making it extremely difficult for Iran to receive payments or engage in global trade. In effect, Iran was being economically quarantined: its primary export (oil) could barely find buyers, and its banks could not easily transact. This was one of the most comprehensive buyers’ embargoes ever targeted at a single country’s main export.

Impact: The impact on Iran’s economy was quick and punishing. Oil revenues plummeted as European markets vanished and other importers cut volumes. By 2012–2014, Iran had lost an estimated $100 billion in oil revenue due to these sanctions. The Iranian currency (rial) depreciated dramatically, inflation soared (over 30%), and ordinary Iranians felt acute pain as prices of basic goods rose and jobs dried up. This economic crisis created intense pressure on Iran’s leadership. In mid-2013, facing popular discontent, Iranians elected a more moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned on easing sanctions through diplomacy. The new government quickly entered negotiations with the U.S., EU, and other world powers. The result was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed in 2015 – a deal in which Iran accepted strict limits and oversight on its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions.

The sequence of events makes Iran’s case a clear example of a buyers’ embargo achieving its immediate objective. Multiple observers noted that Iran’s decision to come to terms was driven largely by the economic strangulation caused by the oil embargo and related measures. Once the deal was implemented in 2016, sanctions were relaxed and Iran’s economy rapidly rebounded – oil exports and trade surged back as Iran regained access to global markets. This whiplash effect underscored just how effective the embargo had been: it starved the economy, then its removal fed the economy, illustrating leverage in action.

That said, the Iran embargo’s long-term effectiveness is mixed. It succeeded in forcing a policy change (the nuclear pause), but that success was somewhat transient. In 2018, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed sanctions; Iran in turn resumed higher levels of nuclear activity. This back-and-forth shows both the power and the limits of embargoes. They can create a window for diplomatic resolution, but lasting success requires that all sides honor the agreement. If sanctions are snapped back without broad international support (in this case, the EU disapproved of the U.S. withdrawal), the target may choose to endure the pressure rather than negotiate again. Nonetheless, the 2012 oil embargo on Iran remains a textbook case of a well-coordinated international buyers’ embargo making a clear impact: it brought a defiant state to the bargaining table by crippling its key economic artery.

Sanctions on Russia following the Ukraine Invasion (2022–Present)

Context & Goal: A very recent example of an international buyers’ embargo is the response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Outraged by this breach of peace and sovereignty, a coalition of countries – including the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Australia, and others – launched unprecedented economic sanctions against Russia. A core element was to stop buying Russian fossil fuels, especially oil and coal, which form the backbone of Russia’s export earnings. The goal has been twofold: to punish and weaken Russia’s war effort, and to pressure the Kremlin to reconsider its aggression, all without direct military confrontation between nuclear-armed powers.

Actions Taken: The sanctions regime that unfolded in 2022 is extensive, but focusing on the buyers’ embargo component: Europe moved to sever its energy trade with Russia. The EU, previously Russia’s largest energy customer, banned imports of Russian coal (effective August 2022) and, more significantly, banned most imports of Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products (phased in from December 2022 through early 2023). The G7 nations and EU also imposed a price cap mechanism to hinder Russia from selling oil above a certain price on the world market. Many Western companies independently halted purchasing Russian commodities. By cutting off these major markets, the intention was to drain the revenues Russia relies on (oil and gas had provided as much as 45% of Russia’s government budget). Unlike some earlier embargoes, this effort was highly coordinated among dozens of advanced economies and backed by formal agreements.

Impact: In the short term, the embargo had a measurable financial impact on Russia, though its political impact remains uncertain. Initially, Russia’s export income actually surged for a few months in 2022 because global oil prices spiked (partly due to the war itself). But once the EU oil ban fully came into force, Russia’s energy earnings dropped sharply. By early 2023, Russia’s oil export revenues were down over 25% compared to a year prior, despite still selling similar volumes, because it had to offer steep discounts to find buyers in Asia. In February 2023, Russian monthly oil revenues were a staggering 40% lower than they had been in February 2022. The loss of the European market forced Russia to pivot its oil exports to India, China, and a few other states, often at reduced prices and with higher transport costs. Analysts estimate Russia’s state budget – heavily dependent on oil and gas taxes – has been squeezed, contributing to a fiscal deficit and forcing Moscow to draw on reserves and raise taxes on remaining oil activities. The Russian economy did contract in 2022 (GDP fell roughly 2.1%, a significant decline for a normally growing economy) under the weight of sanctions and war costs, though not as severely as some predicted at the war’s outset.

However, the embargo’s effect on Russia’s behavior has so far been limited – the war in Ukraine rages on, and President Putin has not reversed course. Several factors explain this. First, the embargo is not universal: while Europe, the U.S., and allies have cut imports, other big economies like China, India, and Turkey have continued (or even increased) purchases of Russian energy at bargain prices. This means Russia still earns substantial export revenue, softening the blow. Second, Russia had built up financial buffers (such as a sovereign wealth fund) and found creative ways to circumvent some restrictions (for example, using intermediary countries and shadow tanker fleets to sell oil). Third, and importantly, the political goal – to compel Russia to withdraw from territory – is extremely ambitious and tied to core security issues, making Moscow less likely to yield even under economic duress.

The Russia case underscores that even a far-reaching buyers’ embargo has limits when the target is large, can find alternate buyers, and is willing to absorb pain. Nonetheless, the sanctions have significantly undercut Russia’s long-term economic prospects and war-financing ability. In the words of the International Energy Agency, the December 2022 oil import ban succeeded in “limiting Russia’s revenues” decisively. The full impact will play out over a longer horizon, and the embargo remains a key lever as the international community seeks a peaceful resolution.

Consequences and Considerations

International buyers’ embargoes, as seen above, are powerful but blunt instruments. They carry a range of consequences – intended and unintended – that merit reflection:

Economic Pain vs. Humanitarian Impact

By design, an embargo inflicts economic pain on the target country. But this pain is often felt most acutely by ordinary citizens, not just the leaders or elites whose policies the embargo aims to change. For example, the oil embargo and sanctions on Iran in 2012 crushed Iran’s economy but also caused a 30% spike in consumer prices and shortages of essential goods, severely affecting everyday life. In extreme cases like Iraq in the 1990s or Venezuela in recent years, comprehensive trade sanctions contributed to hyperinflation and scarcity of medicines, with tragic effects on public health.

This raises moral questions: is it right to pressure a regime by potentially endangering the welfare of its people? Sanctioning governments often try to mitigate harm by exempting food, medicine, or humanitarian goods from the embargo. Even so, the broader economic decline can indirectly hurt vulnerable populations. Humanitarian impact is thus a critical consideration – poorly designed embargoes can resemble collective punishment, eroding international support and legitimacy. Effective campaigns attempt to target the ruling apparatus (through financial sanctions, luxury good bans, etc.) while sparing the general populace as much as possible.

“Rally Round the Flag” Effect

In some cases, external pressure can backfire politically. Instead of turning the population against their leaders, severe sanctions might inflame nationalism and resentment toward the countries imposing the embargo. When people feel they are under attack from outside, they may rally behind their government – even a disliked one – out of pride or defiance. This was observed in Russia, where despite economic troubles, many citizens reacted to Western sanctions with anger at the West and a surge of patriotic support for the war effort. Similarly, authoritarian regimes are adept at using sanctions as a propaganda tool, blaming outsiders for hardship and thus deflecting blame from their own misrule.

This rally effect can undermine the embargo’s political aim by reducing internal dissent. It’s not universal (in South Africa, many oppressed people welcomed sanctions as solidarity), but policymakers must gauge how the target population is likely to interpret the embargo – as a justified stance against a bad regime, or as unjust foreign meddling. Working with exiles, opposition groups, or international organizations can help communicate the moral purpose of the embargo to the target’s citizenry.

Evasion and Economic Adaptation

No embargo is completely airtight. Countries will look for loopholes and workarounds to keep trade flowing. This might involve smuggling, using middleman countries to trans-ship goods, rebranding products to disguise their origin, or developing new trade partnerships. For instance, Rhodesia under sanctions managed to clandestinely sell tobacco and minerals through willing intermediaries; more recently, sanctioned Russian oil is blended or shipped via third countries to obscure its origin. Global markets are complex, and determined actors can be creative.

Furthermore, a targeted country may pivot to a strategy of economic self-reliance or seek help from sympathetic allies. Over time, they might develop alternate industries or new customers to lessen the impact (though often at lower efficiency or profit). The longer an embargo drags on, the more incentive there is for both the target and enterprising smugglers to find paths around it. This doesn’t mean embargoes are futile, but it does mean enforcement must be vigilant. Shared intelligence, customs cooperation, and penalties for sanctions-busters are important to uphold the integrity of an embargo. It’s a kind of cat-and-mouse dynamic: as one hole is plugged, another may be attempted. The broader and more multilateral the embargo coalition, the fewer easy havens for evasion.

Costs to the Sanctioning Countries

Implementing an international buyers’ embargo isn’t cost-free for those imposing it. Nations forgoing trade with the target may suffer economic losses too – lost export markets (if the target retaliates or if linked trade is affected), higher prices for substitute goods, or disruptions to businesses that relied on the targeted country’s products. A classic example is the 1980 grain embargo the U.S. placed on the Soviet Union (a form of sellers’ embargo, but the lesson holds): the USSR simply bought grain from elsewhere, while American farmers lost sales and the U.S. agriculture sector was badly hurt. In buyers’ embargo terms, consider Europe’s 2022 pivot away from Russian gas and oil – it came with a cost of sharply higher energy prices for Europeans in the short term, essentially a sanction-related “tax” that consumers had to bear.

Democracies must weigh these costs and build public support around the principle at stake. Sometimes sanctions fatigue can set in if the pain on the home front persists for too long. That’s why sanctioning governments try to calibrate embargoes to minimize blowback – for instance, phasing measures gradually to allow adjustment, or coordinating with alternative suppliers to fill the gap. In sum, an embargo reflects a willingness to accept some sacrifice in order to uphold an international norm or to avert a greater crisis (like war). The calculus can be politically challenging, and unity can fray if costs mount without visible results.

When Embargoes Succeed vs. Fail

A nuanced takeaway from history is that embargoes tend to succeed under certain conditions and fail under others. They are often most effective when the goal is limited and clearly defined (e.g. freeing a political prisoner or holding elections), rather than when the goal is maximal (e.g. regime change, which can make the target dig in). They also work better against countries that are economically smaller or highly dependent on the sanctioning nations (so the leverage is one-sided). By contrast, embargoes struggle against large, diversified economies or when not enough nations participate to truly isolate the target.

Timing and momentum matter too – a swift imposition that shocks the target’s system can force quick rethinks, whereas a slow, lukewarm sanction may simply be absorbed into the target’s long-term planning. Lastly, the psychological impact on the target leadership is crucial: if they perceive the embargo as immutable and likely to intensify, they may come to the table; if they believe they can wait out the international community or exploit divisions, they will be less inclined to concede. As seen, some embargoes (Iran, South Africa) led to negotiation and policy change, whereas others (Cuba’s decades-long isolation by the U.S.) did not achieve their main objective of political change, even after inflicting economic damage, largely because the target’s leadership found ways to endure and maintain control internally.