This is part of a series on nonviolent protest methods, which explains approaches and provides inspirational examples from history. For additional resources, please explore the Museum of Protest’s activist guides and view items in the collection.

A bumper strike is a form of labor strike in which a union targets only one company at a time within an industry, rather than calling out all workers across the entire sector simultaneously.

In a bumper strike, the union selects a single firm and stops work there, while workers at other rival firms in the same industry continue working. The name “bumper strike” reflects that the strike effort bumps from one company to the next sequentially, instead of hitting all at once.

By limiting the strike to one firm at a time, the union concentrates pressure on that specific employer. The targeted company faces a work stoppage and production halt, while its competitors remain in operation. This means the struck firm can quickly lose business and market share to its rivals if the dispute drags on.

For the workers and the union, the action is focused and strategic: only a portion of the workforce is on strike at any given moment, which can conserve union resources and maintain public support by not shutting down an entire industry all at once.

How to Use a Bumper Strike Effectively

Using a bumper strike effectively requires planning, discipline, and a keen understanding of the industry’s dynamics. Here’s how this method can be most effective:

Choose the Target Wisely

The union must decide which company to strike first (and subsequently). Often the initial target is a major player or lead firm in the industry. Striking the largest or most profitable company can set a high benchmark for any settlement, which can then be extended to other companies. For example, unions have often targeted the biggest automaker in contract negotiations, knowing that a victory there can become the pattern for the rest. In other cases, a smaller firm might be targeted first if it’s seen as more vulnerable or more likely to give in, creating momentum for the campaign.

Leverage Rivalry

A bumper strike works best in industries where companies are in direct competition. By keeping all but the target firm operating, the union leverages the competitive pressure. The struck firm’s clients or customers can turn to alternate companies to meet their needs, which hurts the target’s bottom line. This “divide and conquer” dynamic is the core strength of a bumper strike – the struck company stands to lose market share and goodwill every day, which incentivizes a faster concession. The union can even subtly encourage consumers or partner businesses to patronize the non-struck competitors in the meantime (or at least highlight that others are still running), further isolating the target.

Concentrate Union Resources

Because only one segment of the union’s membership is on strike at a time, the union can focus its strike fund, organizers, and public messaging on that one battle. Picket lines, strike benefits, and media campaigns can be concentrated on the firm in question, making the strike appear strong and well-supported. Meanwhile, members at other companies continue working and drawing pay. Those working members often support their striking colleagues through donations or by not undermining the strike (for example, not handling diverted work from the struck firm, if solidarity is strong across the industry). This concentrated support can sustain a longer fight at the targeted firm than might be possible if the union had to support an all-industry walkout.

Exploit Timing and Sequencing

Timing the sequence of strikes can amplify impact. A union might warn that if the first company doesn’t settle, it will then move on to strike the second, and so on. This looming threat can make each company eager to settle quickly – the first to stop the pain, and the others to avoid being next. In practice, if the first target concedes and reaches an agreement, the union can then approach the next firm with that agreement as the baseline, often avoiding a strike at the second company because the terms have been set by industry precedent. In this way, the strikes may cascade: the mere possibility of being the next target brings remaining companies to the table. The approach thus can yield industry-wide gains through a series of limited actions, rather than one massive confrontation.

However, while bumper strikes carry several strategic advantages, they also come with risks and challenges. It’s important for organizers and observers to understand the potential downsides:

Risk of Company Counter-Measures

An employer targeted by a bumper strike might take extreme measures to resist. If a company fears it will permanently lose business to competitors, it might resort to lockouts, legal injunctions, or hiring replacement workers to break the strike. Being singled out could make a firm fight even harder, knowing that the rival companies are not under similar pressure. This risk means the union must be prepared for a possibly intense battle with each target company in turn.

Competitors’ Reactions

In some cases, the other companies (the ones not currently struck) might quietly support the targeted firm or agree not to exploit the situation. For instance, if the industry is tightly knit or has a employers’ association, the competitors could form a united front to resist the union’s sequential strikes. They might share resources or even coordinate lockouts to preempt the union’s strategy. If competitors refuse to increase output or if they help fund the struck firm to weather the storm, the leverage of the bumper strike diminishes. Essentially, the tactic assumes competitive behavior among employers – if instead the employers collude or get government support, the union’s plan can be undermined.

Economic Harm and Backlash

Because a bumper strike intentionally harms one company more than others, there is a possibility of severe damage to the target. In a protracted bumper strike, the struck firm could lose so much revenue and customer base that it struggles to recover even after a settlement. In extreme cases, a company might fall into financial crisis or bankruptcy if the strike is long and the competitors take a permanent lead. This outcome is obviously not desired by the union – a bankrupt employer means lost jobs. So unions must calibrate the pressure, aiming to hurt but not destroy the target. Additionally, the public or politicians might view the tactic as unfairly singling out one business (especially if that business provides essential services), potentially causing a public relations backlash if not explained properly.

Solidarity and Morale Issues

Within the union, a sequential strike strategy requires solidarity and patience. Workers at firms that are not (yet) struck have to watch their colleagues at the target company walk the picket lines and lose pay. If those workers at other firms start to feel safe or complacent because their employer isn’t under strike, solidarity can fray. Conversely, the workers on strike might feel isolated if others in their union are still working. Unions typically address this by emphasizing that everyone will take a turn if needed, and by having the working members support the strikers morally and financially. Still, maintaining unity can be challenging when only a subset of workers is actively on strike. Careful internal communication and democratic decision-making help ensure that members in all the firms understand the common goal and are ready to back each other up.

Despite these challenges, when executed well, a bumper strike can be a powerful tool for nonviolent resistance in labor disputes. It allows a movement to modulate the intensity of a strike – ramping pressure up or down firm by firm – rather than using an all-or-nothing approach. History provides several illuminating examples of bumper strikes in action, demonstrating both the effectiveness of this method and the lessons learned in its application.

Historical Examples of Bumper Strikes

British Radio Industry (1946)

One early example of a bumper strike occurred in the British radio manufacturing industry in 1946. In the immediate post-World War II period, Britain’s economy was transitioning from wartime production to consumer goods. Radio sets and electronic equipment were in high demand as civilian markets revived. Workers in the radio industry, however, faced the challenge of rising inflation and the desire for higher wages after years of wage controls during the war. In this context, radio factory workers and their unions sought to press employers for better pay and conditions. Rather than calling a conventional industry-wide strike that would shut down all radio production, the union opted for a bumper strike strategy.

Implementation

The union targeted one radio manufacturer at a time, effectively rotating the strike across the major companies in the sector. While the details of each step are scant in public records, Gene Sharp notes that the “bumper strike” was indeed used in the British radio industry in 1946, indicating that the union sequentially struck individual firms. For example, they might strike Company A and halt its production while Company B and C remained in operation; once Company A negotiated and resolved the dispute, the strike effort would move to Company B, and so on. This one-by-one approach exposed each company, in turn, to competition from the others. When Company A’s workers were on strike, consumers and retailers could still buy radios from Company B or C, putting Company A under intense pressure to settle quickly or risk losing its market share permanently.

Outcome

The bumper strike tactic in this case proved effective in extracting concessions. Each targeted firm faced a double urgency: the loss of immediate production and the fear of losing customers to rivals. According to accounts of the time, as the strike shifted from one manufacturer to the next, the radio companies one after another agreed to pay raises and improved working conditions to get their factories running again. Although detailed figures from 1946 are hard to come by, the end result was that workers in the industry saw meaningful wage increases in the post-war period, and the union demonstrated its strength without having to idle the entire industry all at once. The British radio bumper strike of 1946 is remembered as a successful use of a restrained strike tactic: it achieved labor’s goals while limiting the conflict to one company at any given moment, thereby minimizing nationwide disruption. This example also sent a message to other sectors in that era of labor militancy – targeted strikes could win broad gains.

United Auto Workers and the GM Strike (1970)

Perhaps one of the most famous bumper strikes was carried out by the United Auto Workers (UAW) union in the United States in 1970. The late 1960s and early 1970s were a period of strong unions and frequent strikes in the U.S., and the auto industry was the industrial powerhouse of the country. The UAW represented workers at all of the “Big Three” automakers – General Motors (GM), Ford, and Chrysler – and had a strategy known as pattern bargaining: negotiating a contract with one company and then pressuring the others to match it. In 1970, as the labor contracts were expiring, the UAW employed the bumper strike approach as part of this strategy.

Context

By 1970, General Motors was the largest automaker in the world and extremely profitable, while UAW membership was at its peak in influence. Instead of striking all three automakers, UAW president Walter Reuther (who tragically passed away in May 1970, just months before the strike) and his successor Leonard Woodcock focused the union’s efforts on GM alone. Ford and Chrysler workers did not walk off the job; their contracts were temporarily extended. This was a calculated move: by hitting the biggest company, the union could set a template agreement that the other two companies would likely follow without a fight.

On September 15, 1970, the UAW called a nationwide strike against General Motors. Over 400,000 GM workers from 145 plants across the country walked out, bringing GM’s operations to a standstill. It was the largest strike in the UAW’s history up to that point, and it only targeted GM – a textbook bumper strike.

Implementation

During the strike, Ford and Chrysler plants remained open and producing cars. This meant that car dealerships and customers could still obtain Ford and Chrysler vehicles, but not GM’s. GM began to steadily lose sales to its competitors the longer the strike went on. The economic pressure on GM was immense. The company had stockpiled some inventory in preparation, but as weeks passed, those ran low. Meanwhile, GM’s suppliers also started to feel the pinch (many auto parts makers had to lay off workers because GM’s assembly lines were idle).

The strike lasted a dramatic 67 days, stretching into November 1970. During that time, GM reportedly lost over $1 billion in profits due to lost production and sales. Newspapers at the time called it a “titanic clash” between the mighty automaker and the union. Importantly, the UAW was able to sustain the strike for that long in part because only GM workers were on strike – tens of thousands of UAW members at Ford and Chrysler continued working, some of their union dues helping support the strike fund for the GM workers.

Outcome

In November, GM finally came to terms with the union. The UAW prevailed in this confrontation, winning a landmark contract. The settlement included an immediate pay raise (estimated around 13% increase in wages), restoration of a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) clause to protect wages against inflation, and a new pension program known as “30-and-out” which allowed workers to retire with full benefits after 30 years of service. These were significant gains for the workers.

As labor historians note, it was a clear victory for the union: even after losing two months’ production, GM conceded to wage and benefit improvements that set a new standard. And crucially, this new GM-UAW contract became the pattern for the other automakers. Ford and Chrysler, which had not been struck, essentially agreed to the same terms in order to avoid strikes at their companies. In effect, the bumper strike achieved an industry-wide result: all Big Three autoworkers got the raises and benefits that the GM workers fought for, but the union only had to actually strike one company to get there.

The 1970 UAW strike against GM illustrates the bumper strike’s power. It showed how a union could maximize leverage by focusing on one firm, and it underscored the competitive pressure on that firm – GM’s losses translated into gains for Ford and Chrysler during those 67 days, which undoubtedly motivated GM to settle. At the same time, the approach minimized the number of workers on strike and kept much of the industry functioning, which likely helped maintain public sympathy (since Americans could still buy cars, just not Chevrolets or Buicks). This example is often cited in labor studies as a classic case of a successful targeted strike. After 1970, pattern bargaining with a one-firm strike became a standard expectation in auto industry labor relations for decades.

Reviving the Tactic: UAW and GM (2019)

Decades later, the bumper strike strategy resurfaced in a high-profile way during the 2019 contract negotiations between the UAW and the Detroit automakers. By 2019, the U.S. auto industry had changed significantly – there were now “Big Three” automakers (GM, Ford, and Fiat Chrysler, the latter formed from Chrysler’s merger into an international company) and the UAW’s membership was smaller than in 1970. Nonetheless, the union still embraced the logic of targeted, sequential strikes. In the fall of 2019, the UAW once again picked General Motors as its single strike target, while reaching temporary contract extensions with Ford and Fiat Chrysler. It was essentially a 21st-century reprise of the bumper strike approach.

Context

The UAW’s contracts with all three companies were expiring in September 2019. The union leadership chose GM as the target company for a possible strike, in part because GM was viewed as financially strong at the time (the company had been profitable and had recovered from its 2009 bankruptcy a decade earlier). Additionally, there were some particular grievances with GM – such as the company’s recent decision to close several U.S. plants – that made it a politically apt target.

On September 16, 2019, when negotiations with GM failed to produce an agreement by the deadline, the UAW called a strike on General Motors. About 48,000 GM workers across the country walked off the job. Workers at Ford and Fiat Chrysler did not strike; their negotiations were put on hold while all attention turned to GM. This became the largest U.S. autoworkers’ strike in over a decade, and the longest since the 1970 strike discussed above.

Implementation

The 2019 strike was highly organized. Picket lines sprang up at dozens of GM facilities, while Ford and Fiat Chrysler plants continued operating normally. Because of this, GM alone bore the brunt of the dispute. The cost to GM was significant: the strike lasted 40 days, during which GM’s North American production was almost completely shut down. Analysts estimated that GM lost about $2 billion worth of vehicle production due to the work stoppage. Dealerships began running low on certain GM models, and GM’s workforce went without paychecks for the duration (aside from union strike pay). However, UAW members at the other automakers were still working and those companies continued to sell cars and trucks, in some cases picking up sales that GM lost.

This created a familiar squeeze. By October 2019, pressure mounted on GM from multiple angles – from lost revenues, from suppliers and dealers, and from the public – to reach a settlement and get its operations running again.

Outcome

In late October 2019, the UAW and GM reached a new four-year contract, and the strike ended after 6 weeks. The agreement secured a number of gains for the workers. Each UAW member at GM received an $11,000 ratification bonus, and the contract provided for two 3% annual wage increases and two 4% lump-sum payments over the four years. Importantly, the deal protected the union’s excellent health insurance benefits (GM agreed to keep workers’ health care contributions at the same low level, with no increase in out-of-pocket costs). There were also provisions to convert many temporary workers to permanent status after a certain period, addressing another union concern.

On the other hand, the union was not able to save three factories that GM had slated for closure – those closures went ahead, which was a bittersweet outcome for the UAW. Nonetheless, the overall contract was seen as a solid win in terms of pay and benefits for current workers.

Once the GM deal was ratified by union members, the UAW promptly turned to Ford and Fiat Chrysler. As planned, the GM contract served as the template. The union pressed the other two automakers to accept similar terms, which they largely did in the weeks following, without the need for those workers to strike. In this way, just like in 1970, a single-company strike set the pattern for the entire industry.

The 2019 UAW-GM strike demonstrated that the bumper strike strategy remains relevant. Even in a changed economic landscape, the basic logic held: strike one company, win a deal, then apply that deal to the others. It was a calculated use of pressure. By not striking all three automakers at once, the union avoided a broader economic shock and could focus its resources on GM. At the same time, GM had more to lose by being the sole target (its competitors weren’t sharing the pain). The successful outcome – significant raises and bonuses for tens of thousands of workers – showed the enduring power of this tactic. The scenario also highlighted one of the risks: GM endured a substantial hit ($2 billion in losses over the strike), and the union had to balance its demands to ensure GM could agree without jeopardizing its future. In the end, the bumper strike in 2019 was managed in a way that both achieved gains for workers and kept GM intact and able to move forward, which allowed the pattern bargaining cycle to continue in the next round of talks.